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I Introduction
It is not uncommon for multiple insurers to find themselves liable for the
same loss.' When two different insurers would each cover a particular loss in
the absence of other insurance, one or both insurers may attempt to limit their
respective liability through the use of "other insurance" clauses in their poli-
cies.' In essence, "other insurance" clauses provide that if another insurance
policy covers the same loss, the issuer of the second policy has primary or sole
responsibility to pay or both insurers are responsible for a stated portion ofthe
loss.' The allocation of liability between insurers when more than one insur-
ance policy covers the same risk and one or both insurance contracts contain
an "other insurance" provision is a commonly litigated issue.' When an "other
1. See Thomas M. Jones & Jon D. Hurwitz, An Introduction to Insurance Allocation
Issues ib Multip le-Trigger Cases, 10 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 25, 26 (1999) ("With the advent of com-
plex multi-claim litigation, cumulative exposure cases, long-term environmental damage claims
and toxic tort litigation, courts have faced the question of how to allocate indemnity payments
among multiple insurers and their insureds on an increasingly frequent basis.").
2. See BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE
COVERAGE DISPUTES § 11.01, at470 (7th ed. 1994) (stating that "other insurance" clauses may
operate to convert primary policy into excess policy); Mark C. Guthrie, Note, "Other Insurance"
Conflicts: A Common-Sense Proposal, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 689, 690 nA (1984) (citing
academic comment on conflicting "other insurance" clauses).
"Other insurance" clauses occur most frequently in automobile liability policy provisions
respecting coverage available when another party is driving the insured's vehicle or when the
insured is driving an automobile other than his own. See Marcy Louise Kahn, The "Other
Insurance" Clause, 19 FORUM 591, 591-93 (1984) (discussing origin and use of "other insur-
ance" clause). However, other insurance clauses are now also found in policies covering aircraft
liability, property damage, comprehensive general liability, professional errors and omissions,
garage liability, premises, lessors and lessees, mortgagors and mortgagees, life insurance with
special death benefits, and burial insurance. Id. In every one of these contexts, the purpose of
the other insurance clause is to limit or eliminate one insurer's liability when another insurer
provides coverage for the same loss. Id.
3. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 2, § 11.02, at 471-73 (describing excess,
escape, and pro rata "other insurance" clauses). The following policy language contains exam-
ples of both a pro rata provision, which applies when another insurance policy covers the same
automobile, and an excess provision, which applies to any vehicle not owned by the insured
driver.
If there is other applicable similar insurance we will pay only our share of the loss.
Our share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all applica-
ble limits. However, any insurance we provide with respect to a vehicle you do not
own shall be excess over any other collectible insurance.
Champlain Cas. Co. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 716 A.2d 810, 811 (Vt. 1998).
4. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 2, § 11.03, at 474-93 (discussing possible
"other insurance" conflicts and citing cases involving those conflicts); Guthrie, supra note 2,
at 690 n.4 (citing academic comment on conflicting "other insurance" clauses); 44 AM. JUR. 2d
Insurance §§ 1781-82, 1785, 1791-1792 (1982 & Supp. 1998) (discussing cases involving
disputes over which insurer has primary liability when one or both policies contain clause that
attempts to limit insurer's liability); A. S. Klein, Annotation, Uninsured Motorist Insurance:
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insurance" conflict involves two or more traditional insurance policies, the
issue is not whether the insured has coverage but which insurer has the
primary responsibility to pay.5
An interesting and more complex issue arises when one source of cover-
age is not a traditional insurance policy, but one of the many available forms
of self-insurance.6 The term self-insurance applies to any portion of a risk for
which an entity lacks commercial insurance.7 Forms of self-insurance range
from a deductible, the first portion of a loss that an insurance policy does not
cover,' to risk retention groups whose members contribute money to cover
losses suffered by any oftheir members." Risk retention groups may resemble
traditional insurance companies; however, risk retention groups are member-
owned.'
°
Jurisdictions differ on how they treat self-insurance for the purposes of
"other insurance" clauses." Several courts have relied strictly on the defini-
tion of insurance in finding that self-insurance is not "other insurance" for the
Validity and Construction of"Other Insurance" Provisions, 28 A-L.R.3d 551 (1969) (discuss-
ing applicability of "other insurance" clauses in context of uninsured motorist coverage and
citing cases on point).
5. See Douglas R. Richmond, Issues and Problems in "Other Insurance," Multiple
Insurance, and Self-Insurance, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1373, 1378 (1995) (stating that "other insur-
ance" clauses are often irrelevant to insureds, but that presence of another insurer on particular
risk is of appreciable economic concern to all carriers).
6. See id. at 1450-59 (discussing cases in which courts decided whether self-insurance
was other insurance for purpose of "other insurance" clause in liability insurance policy). Rich-
mond describes self-insurance mechanisms whereby entities retain all or a portion of their risk.
Id. at 1448-1450. A self-insurer may forgo purchasing any form of insurance policy, or it may
purchase an insurance policy that provides that the insurance company initially pays losses and
defends suits and that the self-insurer reimburses the insurance company for these expenses.
Id.
Self-insurance involves a conscious choice to retain risk and does not refer to a situation
in which an insured merely discovers that it lacks insurance for a particular occurrence because
of some fortuitous circumstance, such as the insolvency of the insurance company. See Jill B.
Berkely, Recent Developments in Self-Insurance Law, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 693, 694 (distin-
guishing self-insurance from mere unconscious failure to insure).
7. See Berkely, supra note 6, at 693-94 (describing self-insurance as "broad and rela-
tively amorphous term" that describes any entity that retains portion of its own risk or lacks
insurance altogether).
8. See M. Paige Berry, Self-Insurance: Is It Rightfor Your Clients, 192 N.J. LAW. 8, 8
(Aug. 1998) (describing formation of risk retention groups, one form of self-insurance, as sim-
ilar to formation of liability insurance companies, except that risk retention groups are owned
by their members).
9. See id. at 8-12 (describing how certain forms of self-insurance, including risk reten-
tion groups, allow members to pool their funds to cover members' potential losses).
10. Id. at 8.
11. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (citing eases deciding whether self-
insurance is "other insurance").
1248 56 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1245 (1999)
purposes of "other insurance" clauses in liability policies. 2 These courts and
some commentators have emphasized that self-insurance is not insurance, but
"is actually the antithesis of insurance as that term is commonly used."'3
Although such a viewpoint might apply to some situations, particularly those
in which the self-insured simply forgoes insurance in the hope that it will have
no losses or only manageable losses,14 many modem self-insurance schemes
have characteristics of traditional insurance policies, such as the spreading of
risk between several entities.15 For this reason, other courts have applied
detailed, fact-based analyses to determine whether insurance companies can
treat a particular form of self-insurance like a traditional insurance policy.16
Several courts have expressly considered the public policy and fairness issues
surrounding the treatment of self-insurance in deciding the issue."'
Determining whether self-insurance is "other insurance" necessarily
entails the consideration of whether self-insurance is a form of insurance.
When courts determine the nature of self-insurance in the "other insurance"
clause context, the decisions may have implications beyond assigning liability
between insurance providers and self-insureds. For example, in some jurisdic-
tions, a governmental entity waives sovereign immunity by purchasing insur-
ance." In those jurisdictions, the issue of whether or not self-insurance is
"insurance" may determine whether the municipality is immune from a law-
12. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text (discussing courts' reasons for finding
that self-insurance is not "other insurance").
13. See Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Marriott Homes, Inc., 238 So. 2d 730, 732
(Ala. 1970) (determining that "other insurance" provision of workmen's compensation policy
did not include self-insurance obtained by insured under compensation statute); see also
OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 2, § 13.13, at 603 (asserting that, because insurance is
mechanism for transference of risk from one person or organization to another and different
entity, self-insurance is not insurance).
14. See LEER. Russ& THOMAS F. SEGALLA, 1 CoucHONINSURANCE § 10:2, at 10-4 to
10-5 (3d ed. 1995) (stating that determination of whether self-insurer is providing insurance
depends in part on "whether the entity has made a conscious, calculated decision to estimate its
risk and set aside sufficient funds to cover expected losses, or simply and somewhat offhandedly
decided to save the cost of purchasing insurance by merely hoping that no losses would occur").
15. See Berry, supra note 8, at 8-11 (explaining how risk retention groups spread the risk
of liability exposure among their members).
16. See Richmond, supra note 5, at 1454-55 (stating that some self-insurance mechanisms
so strongly resemble insurance that courts must treat them as such and that inquiry requires fact-
specific analysis).
17. See infra Part IV.D (discussing courts' public policy and fairness arguments).
18. See, e.g., GA. CODEANN. § 33-24-51(b) (1999) ("Whenever a municipal corporation,
a county, or any other political subdivision of this state shall purhase... insurance ... its
governmental immunity shall be waived to the extent of the amount of insurance so pur-
chased."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (1994) (authorizing any city to waive its immunity from
civil liability in tort by purchasing liability insurance).
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suit."9 The question is also important in determining responsibilities associ-
ated with litigation management and settlement.20 Therefore, prior court
decisions on these issues are relevant to determining whether self-insurance
is "other insurance."
This Note considers when, if ever, courts should treat self-insurance as
other insurance for the purpose of "other insurance" clauses in liability insur-
ance policies. Part II discusses why many governmental and business entities
are electing to self-insure all or part oftheir risks, and it briefly describes some
of the more common forms of self-insurance that businesses and governments
currently employ.2 Part III provides background information on the uses of
"other insurance" clauses in common liability policies and how these clauses
can lead to conflicts between insurers over their respective responsibility for
a loss.' In Part IV, this Note discusses the various approaches that different
courts have taken regarding the issue of whether the phrase "other insurance"
includes self-insurance.' Part IV also identifies factors that some courts have
considered in resolving the issue, including the role of state law.24 Part V
proposes a structured approachto determining whether courts should treat self-
insurance as "other insurance" that is based on the relationship between the
tortfeasor and the self-insured and that incorporates relevant state law.'
19. See infra notes 229-36 and accompanying text (citing cases and authorities discussing
whether self-insurance waives sovereign immunity). Laws in some jurisdictions explicitly state
whether an entity waives sovereign immunity by self-insuring. See infra note 236 (listing state
statutes that provide that entities waive sovereign immunity by self-insuring and listing statutes
of other states that provide that entities do not waive sovereign immunity by self-insuring).
20. See generally Hall F. McKinley MTI et al., Issues in the Selection of Counsel and
Control ofLitigation When the Insured Has a Self-InsuredRetention, 32 TORT & INS. L.. 769
(1997) (discussing litigation management issues involving self-insured retentions). The authors
assert that finding a self-insured entity is an "insurer" in one context necessitates that a self-
insured be an "insurer" for other purposes. Id. at 775. But cf Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 14,
§ 10:2, at 10-4 (stating that whether self-insured party is providing insurance depends in part
on purpose of analysis).
For a discussion of the issues surrounding litigation and settlement negotiations when an
insurance policy contains a self-insurance feature, see generally William T. Barker, Combining
Insurance and Self Insurance: Issues for Handling Claims, 61 DEF. COUNS. J. 352 (1994),
McKinley et al., supra, and Douglas R. Richmond, Self-Insurance and the Decision to Settle,
30 ToRT & INs. L.J. 987 (1995).
21. See infra Part II (discussing why entities choose to self-insure and describing common
hybrid forms of self-insurance).
22. See infra Part IT (explaining use of"other insurance" clauses).
23. See infra notes 116-120 and accompanying text (discussing approaches courts have
taken to determine whether self-insurance is "other insurance").
24. See infra Part IV.C-.C.1 (discussing impact of state financial responsibility laws on
determining whether self-insurance is "other insurance").
25. See infra Part V (suggesting method of analysis for resolving self-insurance as "other
insurance" conflicts).
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II. Self-Insurance
Self-insurance refers to an entity's deliberate risk retention by failure to
purchase insurance.26 However, an entity need not be wholly without cover-
age to be self-insured. Courts and commentators have inconsistently applied
the tenn to any situation for which an entity lacks commercial insurance,
including situations in which the self-insured has retained only a portion of its
own risk.' For example, a company may determine that its financial interest
is to purchase an amount of liability insurance that is less than what may be
necessary to cover its entire exposure to liability.29 The policyholder would
be self-insured for the portion of potential risk above its policy limit.3
Alternatively, a company may choose to retain a portion of the risk before its
policy is called into effect.31
A. The Rise of Self-Insurance
The number of entities choosing to self-insure increased significantly in
the 1980s because of dramatic increases in insurance premiums.32 Numerous
articles described the phenomenon affecting the insurance industry in the
1980s as an "insurance crisis."33 During this period, insurance companies
made drastic revisions to ordinary commercial insurance policies that reduced
26. Barker, supra note 20, at 352.
27. See BLACK's LAwDICTIONARY, 1360(6th ed. 1990) (defining self-insurance as "[t]he
practice of setting aside a fund to meet losses instead of insuring against such through insur-
ance" and noting that "[a] common practice of business is to self-insure up to a certain amount,
and then to cover any excess with insurance").
28. See Berkely, supra note 6, at 693-94 ("Self-insurance is a broad and relatively
amorphous term that has been inconsistently used to describe any entity that lacks commercial
insurance, either altogether or that otherwise retains ascertainable portions of its own risk.").
29. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 2, § 13.13, at 600 (discussing excess liability
insurance over self-insured retentions).
30. Id.
31. See Lori Tripoli, The Perils and Premiums of Self-Insurance Practice, 15 No. 10 OF
COUNSEL 1, 10 (May 20, 1998) (describing stop-loss policy whereby company accepts certain
level of risk and purchases insurance policy that sits on top of self-insured amount); see also
infra Part ll.C (describing "hybrid" methods of combining self-insurance features with tradi-
tional insurance policies).
32. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE
L.J. 1521, 1526-27 (1987) (describing 1980s insurance crisis); Berry, supra note 8, at 8 (stating
that self-insurance first appeared in variety of forms in 1980s due to lack of policy availability
and escalating cost of insurance).
33. See generally, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Insurance
Crisis, 48 OmIo ST. L.J. 399 (1987) (discussing possible causes of insurance crisis and potential
solutions); Priest supra note 32 (describing 1980s insurance crisis); Nancy Blodgett, Premium
Hikes Stun Municipalities, A.BA J., July 1986, at 48 (describing effects of insurance crisis on
municipalities).
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coverage and, at the same time, increased premiums.34 In addition, insurers
began to refuse coverage at any price to certaintypes of entities with the poten-
tial for extremely high tort liability.35 Although authorities dispute the precise
cause of the crisis,36 declining interest rates that greatly reduced insurance
companies' investment profits and the trend in modem tort law of expanding
corporate and municipal liability exposure exacerbated the industry's prob-
lems.37
Insurance buyers during the 1980s insurance crisis turned to self-insur-
ance primarily because insurance was either unavailable or unaffordable.38 In
recent years, however, buyers' reasons for self-insuring have focused on the
advantages of self-insurance. 39 In fact, self-insurance appears to be a growing
practice despite improvements in the insurance market and insurance compa-
nies' efforts to win back clients. 40 Experimenting with self-insurance during
the insurance crisis of the 1980s may have convinced management in many
corporations and municipalities that they can, at least in some respects, do
better on their own.41 Furthermore, despite the current favorable insurance
34. See Priest; supra note 32, at 1526-27 (describing 1980s insurance crisis).
35. See id. at 1521,1527 (noting that many insurers refused to insure products and services
such as intrauterine devices and day care, and also refused to insure entities such as nurse-mid-
wives, municipalities, and dayeare centers).
36. See generally id. (discussing three possible theories to explain insurance crisis).
37. See id. at 1524 ("[T]he characteristic of contemporary tort law most crucial to under-
standing the current crisis is the judicial compulsion of greater and greater levels of provider
third-party insurance for victims.... The decline in interest rates ... has led the most fragile
of these markets... to collapse."); Tamura D. Coffey, Comment, Waiving Local Government
Immunity in North Carolina: Risk Management Programs Are Insurance, 27 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 709, 713 (1992) (stating that leading reasons for premium hikes during insurance crisis
were slow erosion of governmental immunity and unpredictability of modem tort law);
Blodgett, supra note 33, at 48 (describing erosion of municipal sovereign immunity and falling
interest rates as factors contributing to "insurance panic").
38. See Priest, supra note 32 at 1522 (stating that municipalities and commercial entities
joined mutual insurance groups because municipalities and commercial entities were unable to
obtain market insurance).
39. See Barker, supra note 20, at 352-53 (discussing why insurance buyers have turned
to alternative risk transfer vehicles).
40. See Tripoli, supra note 31, at 14 (describing effect of end of 1980s insurance crisis
on self-insurance law); Albert B. Crenshaw, Liability's Soft Landing: '80s Crunch Gives Way
to Lower Insurance Costs as CommunitiesAdapt, WAsI. POST, Oct. 25,1998, at H01 (discuss-
ing why some municipalities choose to remain self-insured despite improved cost and availabil-
ity of commercial insurance).
41. See Crenshaw, supra note 40, at H01 (discussing why some municipalities choose to
remain self-insured, despite improved cost and availability of commercial insurance).
Corporations and municipalities currently employ sophisticated methods of self-insuring
that resemble traditional insurance policies in certain respects. See Berry, supra note 8, at 8
(describing formation of self-insurance cooperatives, or "risk retention groups," as similar to
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market, many entities are second-guessing insurance companies' analyses of
costs.42 Although a number of former self-insureds have gone back to insur-
ance companies because of increased competition among insurers and because
of lower insurance rates, many of these companies are combining commercial
insurance and traditional insurance and are retaining a larger portion of the
risk than they did before they became self-insured.43 In some situations, com-
mercial insurance policies are still not available, particularly for entities or
products with especially high liability exposure, and self-insurance is a neces-
sity.4 Other entities have made a conscious risk management decision not to
return to any form of traditional insurance.4"
B. Advantages of Self-Insurance
A traditional insurance policy is a device to transfer risk. Insurance
companies accept many risks knowing that some will involve losses. 7 The
insured benefits from spreading its potential losses over many insureds' risks,
which allows the insured to purchase coverage at a slight fraction of its
potential losses.48 When an entity or its insurer can reliably predict a certain
level of losses, the entity cannot transfer the risk to the insurer without paying
the insurer the full cost of the losses, plus a transaction fee.49 In these situa-
formation of liability insurance companies); Self-Insurance and RiskManagers: Annual Sur-
vey, 29 TORT & INs. L.J. 391,403 (Gary D. Nelson ed., 1994) [hereinafter Self-Insurance and
Risk Managers] (stating that sophisticated insurance consumers, particularly corporations, are
self-insuring and acting more and more like insurers, causing adverse parties to seek to impose
equivalent duties on self-insureds). Some self-insurance mechanisms so closely resemble
insurance policies that courts have determined that they are not self-insurance, but rather are
insurance. See Eakin v. Indiana Intergovernmental Risk Management Auth., 557 N.E.2d 1095,
1102 (Ind. Ct App. 1990) (determining that Indiana Intergovernmental Risk Management
Authority was actually offering insurance through members' contractual relationship, rather
than, as townships contended, providing mechanism whereby townships could self-insure).
42. See Tripoli, supra note 31, at 11 (explaining why companies choose to self-insure).
43. See id. at 14 (stating that self-insured companies that go back to commercial insurance
companies because of improved insurance rates generally retain a higher level of risk than they
did before becoming self-insured).
44. See id. at 11 (stating that some companies are self-insuring because they cannot obtain
insurance elsewhere).
45. See id. at 14 (quoting insurance practitioner as saying that, once company experiences
controlling its own risk and claims handling, it may continue to self-insure despite favorable
insurance market); infra notes 46-57 (discussing benefits of self-insurance that may not be
obtainable through a traditional insurance policy).
46. Barker, supra note 20, at 352.
47. Id.
48. Id. (describing traditional insurance mechanism that allows insurer to accept risk at
slight fraction of insurer's potential liability).
49. See id. ("Where the size of the prospective insured and the frequency of the losses is
such that a certain level of losses is fully predictable, the losses ... [c]annot be transferred
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tions in which the losses are certain, self-insuring may simply be more eco-
nomical.5" Large, sophisticated entities with predictable levels or types of
losses are particularly likely to make a risk management decision to bear some
or all of the losses themselves." Corporations, charitable organizations and
municipalities and other forms of governmental entities have benefitted from
obtaining self-insurance.
52
The advantages of self-insurance extend beyond having no premiums or
reduced premiums. Self-insureds can elect a form of self-insurance that allows
them to maintain control over their own litigation. 3 Once a self-insured con-
trols its own litigation, it can build a reputation for taking a strict approach to
settlement and can possibly discourage plaintiffs' lawyers who might other-
wise pursue weak cases with the hope of getting the insurance company to
settle. 4 A company also may want to present a vigorous defense and risk a
large verdict in order to protect its reputation, particularly in a products liabil-
ity context.55 Moreover, reputation is also of vital concern to professionals
without paying another entity the full cost of those losses, plus something extra .... ").
50. See id. (describing transaction costs associated with transferring risks to insurers).
51. See Richmond, supra note 5, at 1447-48 (identifing reasons why insureds choose to
self-insure); Tripoli, supra note 31, at 11 (quoting insurance lawyer as stating that entities are
likely to self-insure portion of their risk that is predictable).
52. SeeRUSS&SEGAILAsupra note 14, § 10:1, at 10-3 ("It is primarily large entities like
corporations, charitable institutions, and governmental entities that tend to conclude that self-
insurance would be less costly to them than purchasing insurance from a commercial insurer.");
Berkely, supra note 6, at 693 (listing several advantages of self-insurance to municipalities).
Among the benefits to self-insurers are independence from the traditional commercial market
and control over risk and litigation management issues. Id. However, participation in self-
insurance vehicles may constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity. See id. (discussing outcome
of cases in several jurisdictions in which courts determined whether entities waived sovereign
immunity by self-insuring); infra note 18 & supra note 229-36 (citing eases and authorities
discussing whether self-insurance waives sovereign immunity).
53. See Tripoli, supra note 31, at 11 (describing company's opportunity to direct and
control its own litigation as advantage of self-insurance).
54. See McKinley et al., supra note 20, at 779-80 (noting that large corporations that self-
insure often repeatedly face same type of litigation involving same product or issue and must
factor business considerations, such as setting favorable precedent, into their approach to litiga-
tion and settlement); Tripoli, supra note 31, at 11 (stating that opportunity to be more "defense
oriented" is one advantage of self-insurance).
55. See Self-Insurance and RiskManagers, supra note 41, at 411 (stating that businesses
self-insure in order to protect their reputation). Nelson and Manning explain that insurance
companies and self-insurers have different priorities in handling tort claims:
Business consumers in particular have adopted the self-insurance mode because the
insurance industry was not capable of protecting the intangible interests such as
reputation, product integrity and competitive balance which are integral to the busi-
ness activities of the sophisticated consumer but not relevant to the economic equa-
tions of the liability insurer.
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such as physicians who may agree to pay higher premiums under a traditional
policy in exchange for the right to require consent before the insurer settles.5 6
Because entities that self-insure enjoy these various benefits, the number of
entities that self-insure is likely to grow, creating more opportunities for
litigating self-insurance issues."
C. Combining Self-Insurance and Commercial Insurance Policies
Pure self-insurance, or the absence of any form of commercial insurance
for a risk, is not practical for most companies. 8 Even if a small or mid-sized
company had a substantial likelihood of saving money overall by self-insur-
ing, it would run the risk of a catastrophic loss or a runaway verdict that could
bankrupt the company. 9 For this reason, entities that elect to self-insure often
mix features of traditional insurance with deliberate risk retention.6 Tradi-
tional commercial insurance policies take one of four forms: primary insur-
ance, excess insurance, umbrella insurance, and reinsurance.61 When an insur-
ance policy designates that it is "primary insurance," the insurer usually
controls defense and settlement and pays all claims up to the policy limit.62
An insurer may sell an "excess insurance" policy when some form of primary
insurance is in effect.63 The excess insurer has no responsibility to act unless
the primary coverage is insufficient to cover the loss.' "Umbrella insurance"
provides coverage that is excess over a separate primary insurance policy and
also provides primary coverage for some risks that the primary policy does not
cover.6' A "reinsurance" policy insures some portion of the initial insurer's
56. See Barker, supra note 20, at 357 ("Some insureds, most notably physicians, fear [the]
collateral consequences to reputation or professional licensure of a settlement, and policies
issued to such insureds often require the insured's consent before the insurer may settle.").
57. See Tripoli, supra note 31, at 14 (describing self-insurance legal practice as growing
niche).
58. See McKinley et al., supra note 20, at 771 (stating that possibility of catastrophic loss
or runaway verdict makes pure self-insurance impractical for most companies).
59. Id.
60. See id. (stating that advantages of self-insurance are still available through hybrid self-
insurance mechanisms to companies that cannot afford pure self-insurance); Barker, supra note
20, at 353 (stating that "legal or business obligations may require that insurance be in force as
means of assuring solvent source for payment of claims").
61. See Barker, supra note 20, at 354 (describing traditional forms of insurance).
62. Id.
63. See id. (stating that excess insurance coverage assumes that some primary insurance
is in force).
64. See id. (noting that primary insurer will do all or most claim administration and
adjustment with the excess insurer having no responsibility to act unless the primary coverage
is insufficient).
65. See id. (describing umbrella policies).
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exposure, and the reinsurer has little or no control of claims handling.66
Common hybrid self-insurance mechanisms incorporate some of these tradi-
tional insurance mechanisms and include deductibles,67 self-insured reten-
tions,' fronting policies,69 and retrospectively rated policies.70
1. Deductibles
A traditional insurance policy frequently incorporates a deductible.71 The
deductible is the amount that the insured must pay, depending on how the
policy is written, on each claim, on all claims in the aggregate, or on some
defined class of claims.72 A dispute exists among authorities over whether a
deductible is a form of self-insurance.73 Courts also are inconsistent in their
treatment of deductibles.74 At least one court has determined that a policy
66. See id. (describing reinsurance policies).
67. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (noting dispute between authorities
regarding characterization of deductibles as self-insurance). Compare State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Universal Atlas Cement Co., 406 So. 2d 1184,1186 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1981) (refer-
ring to party as being self-insured for one million dollar deductible) with American Nurses
Ass'n v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 484 A-2d 670, 673 (N.J. 1984) (noting that, although deductible
is frequently referred to as self-insurance, its functional purpose is simply to alter point at which
insurance company's obligation will ripen).
68. See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (discussing respective responsibilities
of insurer and insured when insured has self-insured retention).
69. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text (describing fronting policy, which does
not transfer risk from insured to insurer).
70. See Barker, supra note 20, at 353-54 (describing forms of self-insurance that incorpo-
rate features of traditional insurance); see also Richmond, supra note 5, at 1448 (listing true
self-insurance, or pure risk retention, self-insured retentions, fronting policies, and retrospective
premiums as possible schemes of self-insurance); infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text
(discussing how calculation of premiums of retrospectively rated policies results in insured
retaining some or all of risk of loss).
71. See Barker, supra note 20, at 354 (describing forms of self-insurance that incorporate
features of traditional insurance).
72. Id.
73. Compare id. (describing deductible as form of self-insurance hybrid and noting that
"[e]ourts frequently treat deductibles and self-insured retentions as interchangeable terms, so
descriptions of the policies at issue in decided cases may characterize those policies inaccu-
rately"), and ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANcE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES: REPRESENATION OF
INsURANCE Co eANns AND INSUREDS § 11.31, at 348 (3d ed. 1995) (stating that self-insured
retentions are, in effect, large deductibles), with Richmond, supra note 5, at 1449-49 (listing
self-insurance schemes and distinguishing self-insured retention from deductible).
74. Compare American Nurses Ass'n v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 484 A.2d 670, 673 (N.J.
1984) (noting that, although courts frequently refer to deductible as self-insurance, its functional
purpose is simply to alter point at which insurance company's obligation will ripen) with State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Universal Atlas Cement Co., 406 So. 2d 1184, 1186-87 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981) (stating that company "is self-insured for the $1 million deductible").
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holder is self-insured for the amount of a deductible only with respect to the
insurer issuing the policy containing the deductible.75
Several features distinguish deductibles from another category of risk
retention - self-insured retentions.7 6 First, insurers subtract a deductible from
the policy limits, thereby reducing the insurer's indemnity obligation."
Second, the insurer is responsible for the amount of the deductible, up to the
policy limit, in the case of an insolvent insured.78 Finally, the insured gener-
ally is not responsible for providing its own defense under a policy containing
a deductible.79
2. Self-Insured Retentions
An entity that purchases an insurance policy with a self-insured retention
agrees to pay all claims up to a certain amount before the insurance policy
becomes available.80 The full policy limits are available once the insured pays
the self-insured retention.8' Self-insured retention arrangements also differ
from deductibles in that the insurer is generally liable only for the portion of
the loss that exceeds the self-insured retention if the insured become insol-
vent." Under policies containing a self-insured retention, the insured assumes
75. See Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Transport Indem. Co., 460 F.2d 959, 961-62 (9th
Cir. 1972) (holding that when two policies covered accident and when both policies contained
"other insurance" clauses and one policy contained deductible feature, both companies must pay
prorated portion of loss, with deductible resolved between insured and insurer under policy
having such feature). In Pacific Power, two insurers issued policies to different entities that
covered the same accident Id. at 960. Both policies contained "other insurance" clauses, but
only one policy contained a deductible. Id. at 961-62. One insurer argued that because its
"other insurance" clause also contained the phrase "or self-insurance," its policy should be
secondary to the self-insurance that was in the form of a deductible contained in the other
insurer's policy. Id. at 961. The Pacific Power court decided that the policy holder was not a
self-insurer with respect to the insurance company that had issued a separate policy to another
entity. Id. Instead, the court determined that the "other insurance" clauses were mutually
repugnant and the insurers had to share the loss pro rata, and only the insurer who contracted
for the deductible was able to benefit from it. Id. at 962.
76. See Richmond, supra note 5, at 1449 (explaining that deductibles and self-insured
retentions are superficially analogous, but differ significantly).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See WINDT, supra note 73, § 11.31,at 348 (describing difference between self-insured
retention and deductible).
80. See Richmond, supra note 5, at 1449 (describing forms of self-insurance, including
self-insured retention whereby entity purchases liability insurance coverage that is less than
entity's entire exposure). When a self-insured retention is under an excess or umbrella policy,
it is commonly referred to as the "retained limit." Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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the obligation of providing itself a defense until the insured exhausts the
retention. 3
3. Fronting Policies
The self-insurance form that most closely resembles pure self-insurance,
or total risk retention, is the fronting policy. 4 Fronting policies have no
transfer of risk from the insured to the insurer associated with them. 5 The
insurer functions purely as a surety for the insured's ability to pay claims, and
the benefit extends only to third parties in situations in which the policy
holder is unable to pay a liability owed to the third party. 6 The insured
administers and adjusts all claims and agrees to reimburse the insurer for all
payments that the insurer must make. 7 A company that prefers to retain its
own risk may purchase a fronting policy to meet governmental insurance
requirements.
88
4. Retrospectively Rated Policies
An insured may agree to have an insurer determine its insurance policy
rates retrospectively based on the insured's claim experience. 9 This form of
self-insurance is common in private workers' compensation insurance poli-
cies.90 Under a retrospectively rated policy, the insurer annually determines
the premium cost based on the insured's losses in the previous year.9 At the
end of the year, if actual losses are less than the estimated losses, the insured
83. WINDT, supra note 73, § 11.31, at 348. An additional difference between a self-
insured retention and a deductible is that when a liability policy includes a self-insured reten-
tion, the insured generally adjusts claims, whereas with a deductible, the insurer adjusts claims.
See Richmond, supra note 5, at 1449 (describing difference between deductible and self-insured
retention). Some entities favor self-insured retentions because they generally allow the insured
to maintain control over its own litigation, at least for claims up to the policy limits. Id.
84. See McKinley et al., supra note 20, at 770 (distinguishing "true self-insurance" from
forms of self-insurance in which self-insurer accepts only portion of risk).
85. See Barker, supra note 20, at 353 (stating that holder of fronting policy agrees to
reimburse insurer for all payments that insurer must make on holder's behalf).
86. See id. (stating that insurer functions as surety for fronting policy holder).
87. Id.
88. See Playtex FP, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 609 A.2d 1087, 1091 (Del. Super. Ct.
1991) ("Large companies use fronting policies to comply with statutory filing requirements, and
for business purposes such as leasing property or equipment and satisfying vendors' require-
ments for insurance coverage.").
89. See Barker, supra note 20, at 353 (discussing retrospectively rated insurance policies).
90. See Richmond, supra note 5, at 1450 ("Retrospective premiums are commonly
encountered in workers' compensation insurance policies.").
91. See id. (discussing retrospectively rated insurance policies).
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receives a partial rebate.92 If the actual losses are greater than the estimated
losses, the insured pays an additional premium.9' Under a retrospective prem-
ium arrangement, an insurer may structure its rates so that it is fully reim-
bursed for all losses and expenses and bears no risk other than the continued
solvency of the insured.94 Alternatively, the insured may contract for some
form of risk sharing.95 A common retrospective premium arrangement entitles
the insurer to reimbursement for a percentage of all losses and to an additional
sum to cover defense or claim administration costs.96
I. "Other Insurance" Clauses
Frequently, more than one insurance policy may cover the same loss.97
The insured may have intended to purchase overlapping coverage or may have
done so inadvertently.9" When more than one policy covers a particular risk
of loss, one of the policies usually provides primary coverage with the other
providing secondary or excess coverage.9 9 These designations may be explicit
either in the scheme of insurance that the insured established or in the policies
themselves." In other situations, a court may determine the designation of
coverage after a dispute between the carriers over which policy is the primary
policy or whether the insurance carriers are co-insurers and therefore share the
responsibility to pay.'
"Other insurance" clauses usually take one of the following four forms:
(1) a "pro-rata" clause, (2) an "excess" clause, (3) an "escape" clause, or (4) a
hybrid "excess escape" clause."c2 Pro-rata clauses provide for the apportion-
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Barker, supra note 20, at 353 (stating that one form of retrospectively rated
insurance policy combines claim administration agreement with fronting policy and leaves
insurer with no risk except continued solvency of insured).
95. See id. at 353-54 (stating that retrospectively rated insurance policy may involve self-
insurance up to point and traditional insurance for larger losses or involve risk sharing on some
types of claims).
96. See Richmond, supra note 1247, at 1450 ("The retrospective premium is a percentage
of the losses, often coupled with some portion of defense costs or a charge for claims adminis-
tration.").
97. See Kahn, supra note 1246, at 591-92 (describing purpose and operation of "other
insurance" clause as limiting insurer's liability when another policy covers same loss).
98. Id. at 592.
99. Id. at 592-93.
100. Id. at 593.
101. Id.
102. See Richmond, supra note 5, at 1382-87 (describing four forms of other insurance
clauses).
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ing of the loss between insurers and usually state that the insurer will pay its
share of the loss in proportion either to the insurers' respective liability limits
or to the amount that each insurer would pay if it alone insured the loss." 3
Through the use of an excess clause, an otherwise primary insurer attempts to
make itself only secondarily liable if "other valid and collectible insurance"
is available."°4 An excess clause provides that the insurer is liable only for the
amount of loss that exceeds the other policy's limits. 5 The excess insurer
will apply the full excess policy amount to the amount of loss remaining once
the loss exceeds the limits of the other policy."c An escape clause provides
that the insurer is not liable if any other insurance policy covers the same
loss.107 Excess escape clauses, commonly employed in uninsured motorist
coverage, provide that the insurer is not liable when the limits of the other
insurance equal or exceed its own policy limit. Additionally, when its policy
limit exceeds the other insurance limit, the insurer is liable only for the
difference between its policy limit and that of the other insurance.'
When two or more policies that insure the same risk each contain some
form of "other insurance" clause, the policies may conflict. For example, one
policy may contain an excess clause and another a pro-rata provision. Under
these circumstances, jurisdictions have developed various methods to deter-
mine which party has the primary liability for the claim. 10 9
103. See id. at 1382-85 (providing example of standard pro rata clause that provides for
equal contribution from each insurer or for payment in proportion to each insurer's policy limit).
104. See id. at 1385 (noting that some courts disfavor excess clauses as unfairly favoring
insurers that use them).
105. See id. (discussing operation of excess clause).
106. Id.
107. See id. ("An excess 'other insurance' clause provides that the insurer's liability is
limited to the amount of the loss exceeding all other valid and collectible insurance, up to the
limits of the policy.").
108. See id. (providing example of excess escape clause used in uninsured motorist cov-
erage policy). With certain exceptions, courts generally enforce "other insurance" clauses,
although courts disfavor escape clauses. See also Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of
North Amer., 595 F.2d 128, 138 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating that when case concerns responsibility
as between insurance carriers, and not policy of protecting public, court should consider express
terms of parties' contracts (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 368 F.2d 121, 125
(3d Cir. 1976))); Richmond, supra note 5, at 1380, 1387 (stating that courts frequently view
escape clauses as contrary to public policy and describing certain circumstances in which law
may circumvent or supersede "other insurance" clauses).
109. See Guthrie, supra note 2, at 691-701 (describing courts' treatment of "other insur-
ance" conflicts). Guthrie divides judicial treatment of "other insurance" conflicts into three
distinct approaches. Id. Initially, some courts have attempted to resolve these conflicts by
applying certain criteria to identify the "primary" insurer. Id. at 691-93. The second generation
of resolution methods, adopted by a majority ofjurisdictions, attempts to reconcile the language
of both clauses. Id. at 693-98. The third method, which a growing minority of courts employ,
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IV Self-Insurance as "Other Insurance"
Insurance policies are contracts, and the same principles that are applica-
ble to contracts in general govern the interpretation of insurance contracts.10
Before a court will limit an insurer's liability under the "other insurance"
provision in its insurance policy, the court must determine whether "other
insurance" is available. "Other insurance" refers to the existence of another
insurer that insures the same risk, for the benefit of the same entity, during the
same period of time.'
A majority of the courts that have considered the issue have held that
when an entity chooses to retain the risk of a particular loss rather than obtain
a traditional insurance policy, self-insurance is not insurance for the purposes
of "other-insurance" clauses in liabiit:r policies." 2 A substantial minority of
views the clauses as mutually repugnant, and prorates liability. Id. at 698-701. The Supreme
Court of Oregon employed this third method in Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co.,
341 P.2d 110 (Or. 1959), and courts and commentators commonly refer to it as the "Lamb-
Weston Rule." Guthrie, supra note 1246, at 698-99.
110. See 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 900, at 28 (Walter H.E. Jeager ed., 3d ed. 1998
Cum. Supp.) ("Unless contrary to statute or public policy, a contract of insurance will be
enforced according to its terms."). But cf. James M. Fischer, WhyAre Insurance Contracts Sub-
ject to Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARiz. ST. L.J. 995, 1003
(1992) (stating that rules of insurance contract construction have pro-insured bias that distin-
guishes them from general rules of contract construction).
111. See Paul R. Koepff, "Other Insurance" Clauses, in 13TH ANNUAL INSURANCE,
EXCESS, AND REnqsURANCE COVERAGE DIsPUTES, at 249,251 (Barry R. Ostrager & Thomas
R. Newman eds., 1996) (noting that these situations become significant issues only when there
is more than one insurer for the same accident); Richmond, supra note 5, at 1376 (explaining
what constitutes "other insurance").
112. See Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. National Cas. Co., 804 F. Supp. 768, 777
(E.D.N.C. 1992) (holding that hospital's self-insured retention did not constitute "other valid
and collectible insurance" within meaning of "other insurance" clause of nurse's policy); Uni-
versal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Marriott Homes, Inc., 238 So. 2d 730, 732 (Ala. 1970) (deter-
mining that "other insurance" provision of workmen's compensation policy did not include self-
insurance obtained by insured under compensation statute); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Universal Atlas Cement Co., 406 So. 2d 1184, 1186-87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that
self-insurance, even when someone else administers it, does not fall within definition of insur-
ance and, therefore, is not "other collectible insurance" within meaning of automobile policy);
Idaho v. Continental Cas. Co., 879 P.2d 1111, 1116 (Idaho 1994) (stating that, because self-
insurance does not involve transfer of risk of loss, but retention of risk, it is not insurance and
does not trigger "other insurance" clause in insurance policy); American Family Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 517 S.W.2d 110, 114 (Mo. 1974) (holding that automobile
owner's statutory obligations as self-insurer did not constitute other valid and collectible
insurance within meaning of liability policy issued to employee driver); American Nurses Ass'n
v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 484 A.2d 670, 673-74 (N.J. 1984) (ruling that nurse's own insurance
provider, and not self-insured hospital, was responsible for first $100,000 of settlement claim
against nurse, when hospital held insurance policy covering its employees that included
$100,000 annual self-insured sum and nurse's policy provided that it was excess over other
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courts have held to the contrary.113 Moreover, depending on the facts of the
valid and collectible insurance); Physicians Ins. Co. v. Grandview Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 542
N.E.2d 706, 707 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (determining that self-insured hospital's contract to
provide professional liability coverage for its residents was not "other insurance" within
meaning of residents' professional liability policy); United Nat. Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Gas
Works, 289 A.2d 179, 181 (Pa. Super. Ct 1972) (determining that certificate of self-insurance
issued pursuant to Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code was not insurance policy); Home Indem.
Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 314 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) (determining that
certificate of self-insurance filed by owner of motor vehicle did not constitute "other insurance"
within excess coverage provisions of driver's liability policy).
113. See U. S. Steel Corp. v. Transport Indem. Co,, 50 Cal. Rptr. 576, 585 (Cal. Ct. App.
1966) (deciding that when corporation carried policy of $1,100,000 and was self-insured for
first $100,000, self-insurance triggered excess insurance clause of shipper's insurance policy
and corporation was responsible for first $100,000); United States Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Ins.
Co., 643 N.E.2d 1226, 1261-62 (Ill. App. Ct 1994) (affirming trial court's ruling that insured
must exhaust all available primary coverage, including limits of fronting policy under which
insured is, in effect, self-insured, before proceeding against excess carrier when that carrier's
policy contains "other insurance" clause); White v. Howard, 573 A.2d 513, 515 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1990) (stating that car rental agency's decision to act as self-insurer and secure
applicable New Jersey certificate was functional equivalent of it writing separate insurance
policy covering itself); Fleming v. Parsons, 206 N.E.2d 46, 47 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965) (finding
contractual financial responsibility bond to be insurance and within meaning of "other insur-
ance" as used in standard policies); Southern Home Ins. Co. v. Burdette's Leasing Serv., Inc.,
234 S.E.2d 870, 872 (S.C. 1977) (stating that, because self-insurer qualified under statute must
provide same protection that statutory liability policy provides, self-insurance constitutes "other
valid and collectible insurance" within meaning of policy); Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Budget
Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 796 S.W.2d 763, 769 (Tex. App. 1990) (holding that liability coverage
provided by licensed self-insured car rental agency was "other valid and collectible" insurance
within meaning of excess insurance clause of renter's liability policy); Chambers v. Agency
Rent-A-Car, Inc., 878 P.2d 1164, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (stating that car rental agency's
choice to self-insure its vehicle fleet did not relieve it of primary responsibility for claims arising
from accidents involving permissive use by others of its cars); Champlain Cas. Co. v. Agency
Rent-A-Car, Inc., 716 A.2d 810, 814 (Vt. 1998) (concluding that self-insured rental car agency
provided to lessees insurance which constituted "other collectible insurance" for purposes of
automobile liability policy); Hillegass v. Landwehr, 499 N.W.2d 652, 655-56 (Wis. 1993)
(concluding that corporation's self-insurance of its automobiles constituted "other collectible
insurance" as provided in injured motorist's own automobile insurance policy).
A situation similar to the "other insurance" problem arises when an insurer that state law
would normally consider primary, such as the insurer who is closest to the risk, provides cover-
age in the form of self-insurance. See generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Budget
Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 359 N.W.2d 673 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (determining that, when car
rental agency held insurance policy and was self-insured for first $100,000 of exposure,
agency's responsibilities were same as any other insurer). These kinds of cases suggest that the
same principles would apply to determining whether self-insurance is "other insurance."
Compare id. (treating self-insured company like ordinary insurer) with Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.
v. World Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc., 284 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809-10 (App. Div. 1967) (refusing to
equate certificate of self-insurance with insurance contract or policy and ruling insurer that
issued policy covering leased automobile provided only coverage).
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case, some jurisdictions accord different treatment to different forms of self-
insurance,"' and the issue remains undecided in other jurisdictions.'1 5
Courts have considered various factors in determining whether "other
insurance" clauses include self-insurance. Some courts have framed the ques-
tion as whether the relationship between the self-insurer and the tortfeasor
resembles insurance." 6 Many other courts base their decisions on whether
self-insurance fits an ordinary definition of "insurance,""' 7 or whether a lay
person's understanding of insurance includes self-insurance." 8 Under some
circumstances, state financial responsibility laws affect courts' analysis of
what the term "insurance" encompasses." 9 Public policy considerations also
affect some courts' determinations. 20
A. Relationship of the Parties
One way to approach the "other insurance" question is to determine
whether the relationship between the self-insurer and the tortfeasor closely
resembles insurance.' 2 ' Posing the question in this manner makes it possible
to reconcile some cases that seem to be contradictory when the question is
posed simply as whether self-insurance is "other insurance."'" Two Texas
114. Compare American Nurses Ass'n v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 484 A.2d 670, 673-74 (N.J.
1984) (holding that nurse's own insurance provider, and not self-insured hospital, was responsi-
ble for first $100,000 of settlement claim against nurse, when hospital held insurance policy
covering its employees that included $100,000 annual self-insured sum and nurse's policy
provided that it was excess over other valid and collectible insurance) with White v. Howard,
573 A.2d 513, 515 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (stating that car rental agency's decision
to act as self-insurer and secure applicable New Jersey certificate was functional equivalent of
its writing separate insurance policy covering itself).
115. See Richmond, supra note 5, at 1454-55 (stating that too few courts have decided
whether self-insurance constitutes "other insurance" to safely declare majority position).
116. See infra Part IVA (discussing cases that have considered relationship between tort-
feasor and self-insurer).
117. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text (noting that courts have relied on
definition of insurance to conclude that self-insurance is not insurance).
118. See infra note 149 and accompanying text (citing cases in which courts determined
that self-insurance is not included in lay definition of insurance).
119. See infra Part IV.C (discussing role of state financial responsibility law in analyzing
self-insurance).
120. See infra Part IV.D (discussing courts' public policy and fairness arguments regarding
treating self-insurance as "other insurance").
121. Champlain Cas. Co. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 716 A.2d 810, 814 (Vt. 1998)
(concluding that car rental agency's rental contract and self-insurance obligation under state
financial responsibility and compulsory insurance laws were "other collectible insurance" as
provided in lessor's own automobile insurance policy).
122. See id. at 813 (stating that, viewed from perspective of relationship between self-
insured and tortfeasor, there is far less disagreement in cases than superficial perusal would
suggest).
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appellate court decisions, Home Indemnity Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining
Co.1" and Hartford Casualty Insurance Co. v. Budget-Rent-A-Car Systems,
Inc. ,124 illustrate this point.
InHome Indemnity, an automobile liability insurer soughtto charge a self-
insured oil company with the sole financial responsibility to pay a claim that
arose from an accident caused by an employee of the oil company." The
insurance company's potential responsibility came from the driver's own lia-
bility policy that covered his operation of any unowned automobile. 26 The
insurance company argued that its coverage was excess to the self-insurance
that the oil company provided because of an excess coverage provision in the
driver's liability policy." The provision stated that the insurer was liable only
for damages that were not covered by "other valid and collectible insurance.""12
As a prerequisite for qualifying as a self-insurer under Texas law, the oil
company had agreed to pay "the same judgments and in the same amounts that
the insurer would be obligated to pay under an owner's motor vehicle liability
policy if it had issued such policy to said self-insurer." '29 The Texas appellate
court differentiated between a responsibility to pay the same amounts as a
standard liability policy and the responsibility to assume all the obligations
123. 314 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
124. 796 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. App. 1990).
125. See Home Indem. Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 314 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1958) (determining that certificate of self-insurance that owner of motor vehicle filed did
not constitute "other insurance" within excess coverage provisions of driver's liability policy).
The question in Home Indemnity was whether a certificate of self-insurance that self-insurer
filed under the Texas Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Law constituted "other valid and
collectible insurance" within the meaning of the provisions of a liability insurance policy that
an insurance company issued. Id. at 864. An automobile liability insurer sued the self-insured
party, seeking a judgment that the self-insured party had sole responsibility for the settlement
of a claim against the driver of the self-insured's motor vehicle. Id. at 862. The driver carried
a personal liability insurance policy issued by the automobile liability insurer. Id. at 862-63.
The court looked to the legislative intent of the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Law,
which the court concluded to be protecting the public from judgment proof negligent drivers.
Id. at 865. According to the court, the certificate of self-insurance was no more than a contract
with the State of Texas to compensate an injured party for negligent acts of the driver, if the law
would require an insurance company to do so had it issued a liability insurance policy to the
self-insurer. Id. The court noted that the certificate operated only for the benefit of the state and
the injured party and was not meant to benefit the negligent driver. Id. at 866. The court
distinguished the self-insurance certificate from a liability insurance policy, which includes the
obligation to indemnify the negligent driver against loss. Id. at 865. The insurance company
had contracted with the tortfeasor for precisely this type of indemnification and therefore, the
court concluded, it had primary responsibility for indemnifying the negligent driver. Id. at 866.
126. Id. at 863.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 862-63, 864.
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that exist under that policy."' 0 The critical relationship was between the self-
insurer and the tortfeasor."' The court stated that an insurer has a responsibil-
ity to indemnify the insured against loss, even in the case of the insured's own
negligence. 32 In contrast, the self-insurer's liability was secondary to that of
the driver.'33 Under the relevant Texas statute, according to the court, a self-
insured car owner contracts with the State of Texas to compensate an injured
party for negligent acts of a judgment-proof driver."3 The court in Home
Indemnity found that the relationship between the self-insured employer and
its employee was not one of insurance because the self-insurer was not obli-
gated to indemnify the negligent employee because it could recover from the
employee any damages it paid the injured party.'35 Unlike a true insurance
policy, the self-insurer's obligation did not operate for the benefit of the
employee.
136
The second Texas case, Hartford Casualty, involved a personal injury
suit by a third party against the driver of a rented automobile.'37 The driver
130. Id. at 865-66.
131. See id. at 866 ("The guarantee by a self-insurer to pay any judgment that an insurance
carrier would have to pay can operate only for the benefit of the State of Texas and the injured
party and cannot... be construed to operate for the benefit of the negligent driver ... and
deprive the self-insurer of his right ofjudgment over him.").
132. See id. at 865 (describing obligation to indemnify insured against loss from insured's
own negligence as obligation of standard liability policy).
133. See id. (noting that had injured party sued driver, driver's automobile liability
insurance company, and driver's self-insured employer, employer could have pleaded against
driver and could have recovered judgment against driver for such sum as was decreed against
employer).
134. See id. at 865 ("[T]he car owner has merely contracted with the State of Texas that
he too agrees to compensate an injured party for negligent acts of the driver, if an insurance
company would be required to do so, has it issued a policy of liability insurance to the self-
insurer.").
135. See id. (describing obligation to indemnify insured against loss, including loss from
insured's own negligence, as most important obligation of standard liability policy); cf.
Champlain Cas. Co. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 716 A.2d 810,813-14 (Vt. 1998) (determining
that self-insured lessor provided "insurance" to lessee because rental contract provided that
lessor would indemnify lessee and operated for lessee's benefit).
136. See Home Indem. Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 314 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1958) (stating that employee could not sustain a suit against his self-insured employer for
recoupment of damages paid by employee in satisfaction of'judgment rendered against him as
a result of his primary negligence).
137. See Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 796 S.W.2d 763, 769
(Tex. App. 1990) (holding that liability coverage provided by licensed self-insured car rental
agency was "other valid and collectible" insurance within meaning of excess insurance clause
of renter's liability policy). The court in Hariford Casualty decided whether an automobile
rental agency's liability coverage constituted other valid and collectible insurance under the
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held a comprehensive automobile liability policy that covered the use of other
cars, but the policy contained a clause providing that coverage was excess
over any other policy. 38 The car rental agency was a licensed self-insurer.
13 9
The court in Hartford Casualty determined that the principles announced in
Home Indemnity were applicable in determining which insurer had primary
liability. 4 The Hartford Casualty court, however, reached a different result
based on the provisions of the car rental contract at issue.'41 The car rental
contract expressly stated that the self-insured rental company would provide
automobile liability coverage under the standard provisions ofthe basic Texas
automobile liability insurance policy and that the insurance so provided would
apply before any other insurance available to the lessee. 42 Because the car
rental agency provided that the tortfeasor could collect the insurance, the
Hartford Casualty court decided that the rental agency had provided "other
valid and collectible insurance."'43
excess insurance clause of the lessee's comprehensive automobile insurance policy, thereby
making the self-insured rental agency responsible for providing primary liability coverage. Id.
at 769. The rental agency and lessee entered into a rental agreement wherein the agency agreed
to provide automobile liability coverage in accordance with the standard provisions of a basic
automobile liability insurance policy for liability that the lessor incurred arising from the
operation of the rented vehicle. Id. at 765. The agreement also stated that the liability insurance
described therein would apply before any other insurance available to the lessor. Id. In
contrast, the lessor's own liability insurance contained a clause stating that coverage provide
by it would be excess over any other valid and collectible insurance with respect to a hired
automobile. Id. at 765-66. According to the court, under the principles delineated in Home
Indemnify, other valid and collectible insurance must be collectible insurance inuring to the
benefit of the insured driver. Id. at 768. The court distinguished Home Indemnity, in which the
only pertinent contract was an agreement between Humble and the State of Texas, based on the
existence of a contract between the self-insurer and the lessor in the present facts. Id. Central
to the opinion was the fact that the rental agency had agreed to indemnify the lessor and the
agreement was for the benefit of the lessor. Id. The court noted its obligation to enforce the
written intentions of the parties, as expressed in the rental agreements, and it held that the rental
agency was responsible for providing primary coverage. Id. at 769.
138. Id. at 765-66.
139. Id. at766.
140. See id. at 767 (discussing court's determination in Home Indemnity that self-insurer's
guarantee to pay any judgments that insurance carrier would pay operates only for benefit of
State and injured party).
141. See id. at 768 (distinguishing Home Indemnity from Harford Casualty based on exis-
tence of contract for liability coverage between self-insurer and negligent driver in Hartford
Casualty).
142. Id. at 766.
143. See id. at 769 (noting that contract between driver and self-insured rental car agency
provided that rental car agency would provide liability coverage in accordance with standard
provisions of basic automobile liability insurance policy).
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B. Defining Insurance
Many of the courts that have considered whether self-insurance is "other
insurance" have attempted to classify self-insurance either as a form of insur-
ance or as the "antithesis of insurance." 1" Several courts have relied on a
narrow definition of insurance in holding that self-insurance is not "other
insurance" for the purpose of determining primary liability.4  These courts
have based their holdings on the absence of a "contract whereby one party
indemnified another against loss from certain specified contingencies or
perils." '146 Under this and similar definitions, courts exclude common self-
insurance schemes from classification as insurance because the self-insurance
mechanisms lack an insurance contract147 or a transfer of risk from one party
to another.' Courts also have considered what a lay person would consider
constitutes "insurance" and have determined that the ordinary understanding
of insurance does not include self-insurance.
1 49
In American Nurses Association v. Passaic General Hospital,' the
Supreme Court of New Jersey focused on contract principles to interpret the
144. Champlain Cas. Co. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 716 A.2d 810, 812-13 (Vt 1998)
(noting disagreement between jurisdictions on issue of whether self-insurance is "other collect-
ible insurance" and stating that basing decision on definition of insurance is not helpful when
self-insurer has some obligation to pay for consequences of another's negligence).
145. See Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Marriott Homes, Inc., 238 So. 2d 730, 732
(Ala. 1970) (stating that self-insurance "is actually the antithesis of insurance as that term is
commonly used"); Southeast Title & Ins. Co. v. Collins, 226 So. 2d 247, 248 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1969) (stating that certificate of financial responsibility issued under Florida Financial
Responsibility Law was not "a contract whereby, for an adequate consideration, one party
undertakes to indemnify another" and was therefore not "other insurance" for purpose of excess
clause in automobile liability insurance policy).
146. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Universal Atlas Cement Co., 406 So. 2d 1184,1186
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
147. See American Nurses Ass'n v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 484 A-2d 670, 674 (N.J. 1984)
(distinguishing insurance contract from other risk-shifting agreements); Physicians Ins. Co. v.
Grandview Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 542 N.E.2d 706,707 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (same).
148. See Idaho v. Continental Cas. Co., 879 P.2d 1111, 1116 (Idaho 1994) ("Because 'self-
insurance' does not involve a transfer of the risk of loss, but a retention of that risk, it is not
insurance.").
149. See Passaic General, 484 A-2d at 673 (identifying key question to be what was objec-
tively reasonable expectation of holder of policy with "other insurance" provision and determin-
ing that lay persons would consider "insurance" to refer to another insurance policy comparable
to one insurance company issued to them); Physicians Ins., 542 N.E.2d at 707 (defining insur-
ance contract). According to the Physicians Ins. court, "[a]s a matter of common understanding,
usage, and legal definition, an insurance contract denotes a policy issued by an authorized and
licensed insurance company whose primary business is to assume specific risks of loss of mem-
bers of the public at large in consideration of the payment of a premium." Id.
150. 484 A.2d 670 (N.J. 1984).
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"other insurance" provision of a nurse's professional liability policy.' Pas-
saic General involved a suit by the National Fire Insurance Company (Na-
tional) seeking a declaratory judgment that the policy it issued to a nurse cov-
ering her professional liability was secondary to the obligation of the hospital
that employed the nurse to indemnify her. 52 National's policy provided that
it was excess over any existing "valid and collectible insurance."'53  The hos-
pital held a liability policy that covered the hospital and its employees and
included a $100,000 deductible.154 The court framed the issue as whether the
nurse could reasonably expect the "other insurance" provision to include the
obligation of the hospital to pay a deductible. 55 It concluded that a lay person
would consider insurance to refer to another insurance policy comparable to
the one that National issued. 5 "Other insurance" the court defined as "a
policy of insurance of like kind issued by an insurance company in exchange
151. See American Nurses Ass'n v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 484 A.2d 670, 673 (N.J. 1984)
(stating that key question in "other insurance" inquiry was what was objectively reasonable
expectation of purchaser of liability insurance). In Passaic General, the court determined
whether a nurse's insurance policy was primary with respect to first $100,000 of settlement
claim against nurse. Id. at 672. The nurse's employer hospital held an insurance policy
covering it and its employees that included $100,000 annual self-insured sum. Id. at 672. The
nurse had a contractual agreement with the American Nurses Association (Association) in the
form of a liability insurance policy and was an Association member. Id. at 671. The National
Fire Insurance Company (National) had issued an insurance policy covering the contractual
obligations of the Association to its members. Id. at 672. National's policy provided that it was
excess over other valid and collectible insurance. Id. The hospital that employed the nurse had
a liability insurance policy with the Insurance Company of North America (INA) that contained
a $100,000 deductible or "annual self-insured sum." Id. National sued for a declaratory
judgment that its policy came into effect only after the Hospital and INA had met their obliga-
tions under the INA policy. Id. The appellate court below concluded that the hospital's
$100,000 self-insured sum was merely a deductible and did not constitute "other insurance"
within the meaning of the National policy. Id. at 672-73. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey framed the issue as whether an Association member would reasonably expect the
"other insurance" provision to include the hospital obligation to indemnify its employees. Id.
at 673. According to the court, a lay person would consider the clause to refer to a traditional
insurance policy and would not expect the clause to include the obligation of the hospital to pay
a deductible. Id. The court noted that there was nothing in the INA policy that required the
hospital to indemnify its employees and did not consider the hospital's voluntary obligation to
protect employees who had no insurance coverage to be insurance. Id. at 673-74. Therefore,
the court held that National's policy was primary insurance with respect to the first $100,000
of the settlement claim against the nurse. Id. at 674.




156. See id. ("[L]ay persons would consider 'insurance' to refer to another insurance policy
comparable to the one issued to them.").
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for a premium charged." ' 7 The court did not consider the hospital's voluntary
undertaking to protect employees who had no insurance coverage to be
insurance and noted that the hospital's policy issued by its insurance company
did not require the hospital to pay the first $100,000 of a settlement or judg-
ment obtained by a third person against a hospital employee.15 Because the
hospital's voluntary undertaking was not an insurance policy, the court held
thatNational's policy was primary insurance with respectto the first $100,000
of the settlement claim against the nurse.'5 9
Relying on the definition of insurance to determine what constitutes
"other insurance" does not create a bright line rule. Rather, courts applying
this same test may reach different results depending on how they define
insurance. 160 Although several courts have determined that the definition of
insurance does not include self-insurance, other courts have determined that,
under certain circumstances, self-insurance may fit within the definition of
insurance.161 Furthermore, courts may need to consider more than a standard
definition of insurance when state or federal law authorizes the issuance of a
particular form of self-insurance, such as a certificate of self-insurance 6 2 or
157. Id.
158. See id. (emphasizing that hospital had no contractual obligation to indemnify its
employees and did so voluntarily).
159. See id. (stating that private indemnity agreements are not what parties contemplated
when they referred in their insurance policy to "other insurance").
160. Compare id. (determining that definition of insurance did not include self-insurance)
with Hillegass v. Landwehr, 499 N.W.2d 652, 655 (Wis. 1993) (holding that self-insurer
provided "insurance" within meaning of "other insurance" clause of automobile liability policy).
Defining insurance as "a contract whereby, for a stipulated consideration, one party undertakes
to compensate the other for loss," the Hillegass court rejected what it called the self-insurer's
"attempt to impose an implicit contract requirement not specified in the.., definition" and
instead looked to the nature of self-insurance to determine whether the quoted definition applied
to self-insurance. Id. at 655. The Hillegass court did not rest its decision only on this defini-
tion, however, but discussed public policy considerations as well. Id. at 654. See infra notes
206-224 and accompanying text (discussing Hillegass); see also Fleming v. Parsons, 206
N.E.2d 46,47 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965) (holding that statutory financial responsibility bond issued
to motorist was, in legal effect, insurance). The Fleming court defined insurance as "a contract
by which one party promises, upon a consideration, to compensate or reimburse the other if he
shall suffer loss from a specified cause." Id. at 47.
161. See supra note 160 (citing cases that have determined that definition of insurance
includes self-insurance). .
162. Compare American Family Mut Ins. Co. v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 517 S.W.2d
110, 112, 114 (Mo. 1974) (determining that company's certificate of self-insurance from direc-
tor of revenue and agreement under financial responsibility laws to pay same judgments as
insurer would have to pay did not constitute "other valid and collectible insurance" within
meaning of liability policy issued to employee driver) with Chambers v. Agency Rent-A-Car,
Inc., 878 P.2d 1164, 1166-67 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (determining that self-funded rental agency
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a surety bond,163 as a substitute for an otherwise mandatory insurance poli-
cy. 6' Although the definition of insurance is a helpful starting point for an
analysis of whether courts should consider self-insurance to be "other insur-
ance," it is not reliable as a single-step test.
C. Role of State Law
The process of determining whether an entity is providing insurance
becomes more difficult when the applicable state law requires certain entities
to possess proof of financial responsibility and allows those entities to obtain
either a commercial insurance policy or a state-issued certificate of self-insur-
ance. 6' States may issue certificates of self-insurance or otherwise permit
private entities to self-insure in various situations in which the law requires
proof of financial responsibility, such as for registering motor vehicles166 or
for obtaining professional or business licenses. 67 When state legislatures do
had primary responsibility for accident coverage under Utah's motor vehicle financial responsi-
bility law requiring holders of certificates of self-funded coverage to pay benefits as would
insurer issuing policy to self-funded person).
163. Compare Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, 180 Cal. Rptr. 546,550
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that surety bond is nothing more than undertaking to indemnify
person or public against losses resulting from acts of principle) with Fleming, 206 N.E.2d at 47
(stating that statutory financial responsibility bond issued to motorist is, in legal effect, automo-
bile liability insurance and is "other insurance" within standard automobile liability policy
issued by another insurer).
164. See Chambers, 878 P.2d at 1166 (defining "insurance" under Utah code and stating
that fact that self-insured did not issue tortfeasor policy of "insurance" was immaterial to
determining liability). The Utah Code defines insurance as "any arrangement, contract or plan
for the transfer of risk or risks from one or more persons to one or more other persons .... "
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(40) (West 1999). The court considered the fact that the self-
insured automobile rental agency did not receive a premium from the lessor and required the
lessor to acknowledge that she had other insurance to be immaterial. See Chambers, 878 P.2d
at 1166. The self-insurer was responsible for the same obligations that an insurer would have
had to pay because Utah law expressly so required. Id.
165. See infra notes 170-80 and accompanying text (discussing role of state financial
responsibility law in determining whether self-insurance constitutes other insurance).
166. See 7 AM. JU 2d Automobile Insurance § 1 (1997) (stating that some states have
enacted statutes providing that cash deposit, certificate of insurance, or surety bond filed to meet
financial responsibility requirements are the equivalent of policy of automobile insurance for
purposes of determining primary or excess coverage in event of automobile collision).
167. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.100 (Michie 1998) (requiring proof of financial
responsibility, including self-insurance option, as prerequisite to receiving permit for disposal
of hazardous waste); CoLo. REV. STAT. AiN. § 12-40-126 (West 1998) (requiring optometrists
to establish financial responsibility by approved method, including approved plans of self-
insurance); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.320 (West 1991) (requiring one form of medical malpractice
insurance, including self-insurance plan, as condition of issuance or renewal of license for
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not state explicitly in what situations self-insureds are to be treated like insur-
ance agencies, courts may consider the legislative intent behind the financial
responsibility laws. 6 Recently, some courts also have considered the public
policy and fairness issues underlying the treatment of self-insurance as "other
insurance.
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1. State Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Laws
State motor vehicle financial responsibility laws in most jurisdictions
require that automobile owners obtain liability insurance. 70 Many states
allow automobile owners to satisfy the compulsory insurance requirement by
acquiring a commercial insurance policy or by self-insuring.' Usually, a
public service commission or another state agency is responsible for issuing
certificates of self-insurance to an entity that produces sufficient proof of the
ability to pay judgments of a legally designated amount.'7 2 In many jurisdic-
practice of medicine); IDAHO CODE § 20-805 (Supp. 1999) (making insurance or self-insurance
mandatory before award of contract to operate private prison); 105 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN.
105/15a (West 1998) (requiring that each contractor on approved list of asbestos abatement
contractors submit certificate documenting that contractor carries liability insurance or self-
insurance); IND. CODE ANN. § 8-21-3-22 (West 1991) (providing for issuance of certificate of
self-insurance, in order to permit aircraft owner to comply with Aircraft Financial Responsibility
Act, when department is satisfied that person is possessed of financial ability to respond to
judgments arising out of ownership, maintenance, use or operation of aircraft); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 3:3410.1 (West 1987) (providing for creation and operation of program of self-insurance
for licensed warehousemen and grain dealers); MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-1-107 (1999) (provid-
ing that company commencing seismic activity must be prepared to present evidence of insur-
ance or self-insurance); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 111 .35a (West 1995) (providing that secretary
shall not grant pesticide application license until applicant has furnished evidence of financial
responsibility, consisting of surety bond, self-insurance or liability insurance policy).
168. See infra note 200 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts have
considered legislative intent behind financial responsibility statutes).
169. See infra notes 201-207 and accompanying text (discussing public policy and fairness
issues).
170. See Ellis v. Rhode Island Pub. Transit Auth., 586 A.2d 1055, 1059 (R.L 1991)
(stating that Rhode Island is one state in small minority of jurisdictions that does not require its
motorists to carry mandatory liability insurance); Richmond, supra note 5, at 1452-53 (noting
general rule that self-insurance is not other insurance may be inapplicable in automobile liability
insurance context).
171. See 7 AM. JUl. 2d Automobile Insurance § 1 (1997) (stating that some states have
enacted statutes providing that cash deposit, certificate of insurance, or surety bond filed to meet
financial responsibility requirements are equivalent of automobile insurance for purposes of
determining primary or excess coverage in event of automobile collision); see also infra note
184 (listing state statutes that allow automobile owners to obtain certificates of self-insurance
in lieu of liability insurance policy if owner satisfies certain prerequisites).
172. See Home Indem. Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 314 S.W.2d 861,862-63 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1958) (stating that, as prerequisite to qualifying as self-insurer under Texas Motor Vehicle
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tions, only relatively large entities with substantial assets can qualify for state-
issued certificates of self-insurance.
173
The Supreme Court of Vermont's decision in Champlain Casualty Co. v.
Agency Rent-A-Car 74 illustrates the role of state law in determining whether
to treat self-insurance as insurance.' In Champlain Casualty, the court con-
Safety-Responsibility Act, agency agreed to pay same judgments and in same amounts that
insurer would be obligated to pay under owner's liability policy, if it had issued such policy to
self-insured); Champlain Cas. Co. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 716 A-2d 810, 812 (Vt. 1998)
(stating that Vermont law requires self-insured to insure every person operating one of its motor
vehicles).
173. See, e.g., USX Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 645 N.E.2d 396, 402 (Il. App. Ct.
1994) (citing state motor vehicle law requiring that certified self-insured have more than twenty-
five vehicles registered in its name); Southern Home Ins. Co. v. Burdette's Leasing Ser., Inc.,
234 S.E.2d 870, 871 (S.C. 1977) (same); Home Indem. Co., 314 S.W.2d at 864 (same). Some
jurisdictions also allow automobile owners to obtain financial responsibility bonds in lieu of
traditional insurance. See Carter v. Bernard, 269 N.E.2d 139, 141 (Ohio Ct. C.P., Montgomery
Co. 1971) (stating that insurance company had issued and filed financial responsibility bond to
enable motorist with prior conviction for driving while intoxicated to comply -with Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act).
174. 716 A.2d 810 (Vt. 1998).
175. See Champlain Cas. Co. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 716 A.2d 810, 814 (Vt. 1998)
(concluding that car rental agency's self-insurance obligation under state financial responsibility
and compulsory insurance laws and rental contract are "other collectible insurance" as provided
in lessor's own automobile insurance policy). The Champlain Casualty case involved a dispute
over liability for damages that the lessee of one of Agency Rent-A-Car's (Agency) vehicles
caused. Id. at 811. Champlain Casualty Company (Champlain), the automobile lessee's insurer
under a comprehensive automobile liability policy, appealed a lower court ruling that Agency's
self-insurance obligations did not constitute "other collectible insurance" and that Champlain
was responsible for providing primary coverage. Id. The lessee, while driving the rental
vehicle, collided with a vehicle driven by a third party. Id. The underlying suit involved the
third party's claim against the lessee's estate, and both parties looked to both Agency and
Champlain to defend and indemnify. Id. The policy issued by Champlain covered the operation
of a non-owned automobile, but provided that it was excess over any other collectible insurance.
Id. Agency's responsibility was based on its possession of a certificate of self-insurance under
Vermont's financial responsibility law. Id. Vermont law required automobile owners to main-
tain liability insurance and permitted owners to file self-insurance in the amount of $100,000
in lieu thereof. Id. at 812. The stated purpose of the statute was to benefit any person suffering
personal injuries or property damage out of the use of the vehicle. Id. Agency had attempted
to limit its liability through the terms of its rental agreement that required that the lessee have
his own liability insurance covering the operation of Agency's vehicles and provided that cov-
erage under the rental agreement would be excess over any insurance policy. Id. Agency
argued that its self-insurance status was not "other collectible insurance" and that Champlain
was therefore responsible for primary coverage under the terms of Agency's rental agreement.
Id. Champlain argued that self-insurance was "other collectible insurance." Id.
The Supreme Court of Vermont framed the issue as "whether the relationship between the
self-insurer and the tortfeasor can be described as insurance." Id. at 813. The identity of the
tortfeasor was central to the liability determination because Vermont law required a self-insurer
to insure every permissive user of its vehicles. Id. at 814. The court concluded that the relation-
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sidered whether a self-insured rental car company's liability coverage consti-
tuted "other valid and collectible insurance.""'6 The court adoptedits approach
from Home Indemnity and Hartford Casualty, which the Vermont court de-
scribed as based on the relationship between the self-insurer and the tort-
feasor.17 The Supreme Court of Vermont considered the facts of Champlain
Casualty to be closer to those of Hartford Casualty than to the facts of Home
Indemnity, despite the fact that the rental agency in Champlain Casualty did
not offer insurance to those who rented cars from it."' In Champlain Casualty,
the court concluded that the self-insured rental agency's responsibility to
indemnify the tortfeasor was based on Vermont's financial responsibility law,
which provided that a certificate of self-insurance insured every person operat-
ing a motor vehicle owned by the self-insurer with its permission against loss
from the liability imposed by law upon such person.1 79 Because the statute
described the relationship between the self-insured and the tortfeasor as insur-
ance and because the car rental contract did not provide thatthe tortfeasor must
indemnify the rental agency, the rental agency's obligation to pay constituted
"other collectible insurance" for the purposes of the driver's liability policy."'
2. Determining the Extent of the Self-lnsured's Obligations Under
Financial Responsibility Laws
The nature of automobile liability insurance lends itself to frequent
"other insurance" disputes because when an individual drives a car owned by
another, overlapping coverage often exists between the policy covering the
ship between Agency and the lessee-tortfeasor was in substance one of insurance and subject to
the "other collectible insurance" provision of the Champlain policy. Id. The court then turned
to the conflicting excess "other insurance" provisions in each of the policies. Id. The court
determined that the unique characteristics of the situation took the case out of the general rule
that conflicting excess clauses are mutually repugnant and therefore void. Id. at 814-15.
Because Agency required the lessee to obtain or maintain other insurance and the law imposed
Agency's responsibility, the court concluded that Champlain had primary liability. Id. at 816-17.
176. Id. at 813 (concluding that car rental agency's self-insurance obligation and rental
contract constitute "other collectible insurance").
177. See id. at 813-14 (discussing Home Indemnity case, in which Texas Supreme Court
determined that relationship between tortfeasor and self-insurer was not one of insurance, and
Harford Casualty case, in which Texas Supreme Court determined that rental car contract
created insurance relationship).
178. See id. at 814 (determining that Champlain Casualty facts were closer to facts of
Hartford Casualty than to Home Indemnity because self-insured rental car agency in Champlain
Casualty was obligated to indemnify tortfeasor).
179. See id. at 812 (explaining how state financial responsibility law creates insurance-like
relationship).
180. See id. at 814 (concluding that relationship between rental car agency and lessee of
vehicle was in substance one of insurance).
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automobile and the policy covering the driver."' 1 Despite the prevalence of
laws that allow entities to apply for certificates of self-insurance in lieu of
obtaining traditional insurance policies, many of these statutes do not clearly
state whether a self-insurer must assume the same responsibilities that the law
requires traditional insurance companies to assume, such as providing unin-
sured motorist coverage m or mnibus coverage.'83 A common statutory pro-
vision, as a prerequisite to obtaining state issued certificates of self-insurance
in many states, is that an entity must agree to pay the same judgments in the
same amounts that an insurer would have been obligated to pay under an
owner's motor vehicle liability policy if it had issued such a policy to the
181. See supra notes 112-13 (citing cases, most of which involve automobile liability
insurance, involving self-insurance as "other insurance" disputes). At least one commentator
has identified a growing trend to treat self-insurance as "other insurance" in the automobile
liability context. See Richmond, supra note 5, at 1454-55 (discussing lack of uniformity in
court's treatment of self-insurance and noting that courts increasingly are treating automobile
liability self-insurance like insurance). Only a few jurisdictions have considered whether self-
insurance constitutes "other insurance" outside the automobile liability context. See, e.g., Uni-
versal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Marriott Homes, Inc., 238 So. 2d 730, 732 (Ala. 1970) (deter-
mining that "other insurance" provision ofworkmen's compensation policy did not include self-
insurance obtained by insured under compensation statute); Idaho v. Continental Cas. Co., 879
P.2d 1111, 1116 (Idaho 1994) (deciding whether state acted as university's insurer in employ-
ment discharge, tort, and civil rights claim); United States Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 643
N.E.2d 1226, 1262 (1. App. Ct. 1994) (affirnming trial court's ruling that insured must exhaust
all available primary coverage, including limits of fronting policy under which insured is, in
effect, self-insured, before proceeding against excess carrier when that carrier's policy contains
"other insurance" clause); American Nurses Ass'n v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 484 A-2d 670, 673
(N.J. 1984) (determining whether nurse's professional liability insurance policy was primary
over self-insured sum of policy provided by hospital); Physicians Ins. Co. v. Grandview Hosp.
& Med. Ctr., 542 N.E.2d 706, 707 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (determining that self-insured hospi-
tal's contract to provide professional liability coverage for its residents was not "other insur-
ance" within meaning of resident's professional liability policy).
182. See Twyman v. Robinson, 342 S.E.2d 313, 315 (Ga. 1986) (determining that certifi-
cate of self-insurance is "substantial equivalent" of no-fault policy, and thus uninsured motorist
coverage is implied as contained in plan of self-insurance); Transport of New Jersey v. Wailer,
391 A.2d 1240, 1245 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (determining that statute requiring all
automobile liability policies to include uninsured motorist coverage applies to self-insured
vehicles as well). But cf. Gary v. Allstate Ins. Co., 612 N.E.2d 115, 119 (Ind. 1993) (determin-
ing that financial responsibility law does not require self-insured municipality to provide unin-
sured motorist protection for those who drive their automobiles because law applies only to
"insurers" who issue policy of insurance). Uninsured motorist coverage is not liability insur-
ance, but, rather, it is direct compensation to persons that an uninsured motorist injures if the
uninsured motorist is at fault. See RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 14, § 122:2, at 122-7 to 122-9
(describing uninsured motorist coverage).
183. See RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 14, § 10:5, at 10-10 to 10-11 (stating that states are
in conflict as to whether self-insurers must provide omnibus coverage). Most states require that
automobile insurance extend to permissive users of an automobile. Id. This extended coverage
is referred to as "omnibus" coverage. Id.
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self-insurer.184 State courts have disagreed on what statutory obligations their
legislatures intended to include in these provisions.18 In determining the
scope of a self-insurer's obligation under a financial responsibility law, courts
often consider the purpose of the statutes and whom the drafters intended to
protect.'86 Although the Home Indemnity court determined that self-insurance
was not "other insurance" when state law required a self-insurer to pay "the
same judgments and in the same amounts that the insurer would be obligated
to pay, 1 87 another state court interpreted a similar statute differently. 88
184. See ALA. CODE § 32-7-19 (1989) (requiring that certificate of self-insurance, in order
to be considered proof of financial responsibility, be accompanied by agreement of self-insurer
that, with respect to accidents occurring while certificate is in force, self-insurer will pay same
judgments in same amounts that insurer would have been obligated to pay under owner's motor
vehicle liability policy if it had issued such policy to self-insurer); ALASKA STAT. § 28.20.390
(Michie 1998) (same); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-371 (West 1992) (requiring self-insurers
to file evidence that reliable financial arrangements, deposits, or commitments exist providing
assurance for payment of all obligations under statute substantially equivalent to those afforded
by policy of insurance); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:897 (West 1989) (requiring that certificate
of self-insurance, in order to be considered proof of financial responsibility, be accompanied
by agreement of self-insurer that, with respect to accidents occurring while certificate is in force,
self-insurer will pay same judgments in same amounts that insurer would have been obligated
to pay under owner's motor vehicle liability policy if insurer had issued such policy to
self-insurer); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 303.160 (West 1994) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-6-132
(1999) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 485.307 (Michie 1997) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-279.18 (1993) (same); OMiO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.45 (West 1995) (same); OR. REV.
STAT. § 806.130 (1997) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-32-20 (1995) (same); S.D. CODIFID
LAWS § 32-35-64 (Michie 1998) (same); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 601.124 (West 1999)
(same); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.29.450 (West 1987) (same).
185. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (discussing different conclusions
reached by state courts regarding obligations of self-insured automobile owners).
186. See, e.g., Quick v. National Auto Credit, 65 F.3d 741,745 (8th Cir. 1995) (determin-
ing that legislative purpose of financial responsibility law was to ensure certain minimum pay-
ments to injured parties); Jeffreys v. Snappy Car Rental, Inc., 493 S.E.2d 767, 769 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1997) ("The primary purpose of compulsory automobile liability insurance . .. is to
compensate innocent victims who have been injured by financially irresponsible motorists.");
Home Indem. Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 314 S.W.2d 861,866 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) ("The
guarantee by a self-insurer to pay any judgment that an insurance carrier would have to pay can
operate only for the benefit of the State... and the injured party and cannot... be construed
to operate for the benefit of the negligent driver.... ."). But cf Gary, 612 N.E.2d at 119 ("Al-
though we recognize the remedial purpose of the uninsured motorist coverage statute and we
may even agree that public policy favors a requirement that self-insurers ... should be required
to provide ... uninsured motorist protection, it is not our role.., to write such a requirement
into the act."). The Gary court read the statute literally to apply only to "insurers." Id.
187. Home Indem., 314 S.W.2d at 864-65 (determining that certificate of self-insurance
that owner of motor vehicle filed did not constitute "other insurance" within excess coverage
provisions of driver's liability policy); see supra notes 125-36 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Home Indemnity decision).
188. Compare Home Indem., 314 S.W.2d at 864-65 (stating that, when Safety-Responsi-
bility Act provided that self-insurer must pay same judgments that insurer would have been
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In Southern Home Insurance Co. v. Burdette 's Leasing Service, Inc.,"s9
the Supreme Court of South Carolina interpreted a statute permitting a state
agency to issue a motor vehicle certificate of self-insurance to an entity with
"the ability to pay judgments obtained against him."'19 The court concluded
that the legislature intended to require that a self-insurer provide the same
protection to the public that a statutory liability policy provides, including the
provision of coverage to permissive users of the self-insurer's motor vehic-
les.191 According to the court, it necessarily followed that self-insurance
constituted "other valid and collectible insurance" within the meaning of a
liability insurance policy provision."9
As in Champlain Casualty, a state financial responsibility law may create
a relationship between the self-insured and the tortfeasor that requires a court
to treat the self-insurer as the tortfeasor's insurer.' 93 Most states require that
obligated to pay, legislative intent was to protect public from judgment proof drivers and to con-
fine self-insured's agreement under certificate to such obligation) with Southern Home Ins. Co.
v. Burdette's Leasing Serv., Inc., 234 S.E2d 870, 872 (S.C. 1977) (holding that self-insurer that
was qualified under statute had to provide same coverage to automobiles that it owned as auto-
mobile liability insurance policy would provide and, therefore, self-insurance constituted collec-
tible "other insurance").
189. 234 S.E.2d 870 (S.C. 1977).
190. Southern Home Ins. Co. v. Burdette's Leasing Serv., Inc., 234 S.E.2d 870, 871 (S.C.
1977) (holding that self-insurer that was qualified under statute had to provide same coverage
to automobiles it owned as automobile liability insurance policy would provide, and therefore,
self-insurance constituted collectible "other insurance"). In Southern Home, the court deter-
mined whether a state-certified self-insurer must provide the same coverage to automobiles it
owned as the law required insurance policies to provide and whether self-insurance constituted
"other valid and collectible insurance" within the meaning of a liability policy. Id. at 872.
Southern Home involved a dispute over responsibility for damages arising from a motor vehicle
accident involving a rented vehicle in which the driver was insured under his employer's
insurance policy. Id. at 870-71. The insurance company paid the claim and sought reimburse-
ment under the "other insurance" provision of its policy from the self-insured rental car agency.
Id. at 871. The state financial responsibility law in effect at the time allowed owners of 25 or
more vehicles to quality as a registered self-insurer if the entity possessed the ability to pay
judgments obtained against it. Id. The court concluded that the intention of the legislature was
that the self-insurer provide the same protection to the public that a statutory liability policy pro-
vided and that the self-insured must self-insure the operation of its motor vehicles by permissive
users. Id. at 872. The court reasoned that the self-insured's statutory obligations meant that its
self-insurance was "other valid and collectible insurance" within the meaning of the insurance
policy provision. Id.
191. See id. (holding that self-insured motor vehicle rental agency's self-insurance extends
to cover persons using its vehicles with consent).
192. See id. (stating that self-insurance must be considered "other insurance" in order to
carry out intent of motor vehicle financial responsibility law).
193. See id. (holding that self-insurer had to provide same coverage to automobiles that
it owned under statute as automobile liability insurance policy would provide and, therefore,
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automobile liability insurance policies include "omnibus coverage" provisions
that provide liability insurance coverage for permissive users of the insured
vehicle.'94 Courts may have to determine whether the legislature intended to
require that self-insured automobile owners indemnify permissive users of the
self-insurer's automobiles. 9 ' Under one theory, if the relevant statute requires
that self-insurers indemnify permissive users of their vehicles, the self-insur-
ers are providing insurance for those users.' 96 In the absence of an express
requirement that self-insureds provide omnibus coverage, some courts have
determined that a self-insured does not automatically assume that obligation,
even though an insurance policy must provide omnibus coverage.' 97 These
courts have concluded that the obligation of a self-insured is confined to
assuring financial remuneration to injured parties by ensuring that certain main-
self-insurance constituted collectible "other insurance"); see also discussion supra Part IV.C.1
(discussing role of state motor vehicle financial responsibility laws).
194. See Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 14, § 10:5, at 10-10 to 10-11 (describing omnibus
coverage).
195. Id.
196. See id. (stating that states are in conflict as to whether self-insurers must provide
omnibus coverage).
197. See Quick v. National Auto Credit, 65 F.3d 741, 745 (8th Cir. 1995) (interpreting
Missouri's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law to confine self-insurance obligations
to ensuring certain minimum payments to injured parties); Home Indem. Co. v. Humble Oil &
Ref. Co., 314 S.W.2d 861, 866 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) ("The guarantee by a self-insurer to pay
any judgment that an insurance carrier would have to pay can operate only for the benefit of the
State... and the injured party and cannot... be construed to operate for the benefit of the
negligent driver."). Even when financial responsibility laws require compulsory automobile
liability insurance for automobile owners, state law may permit an insurer or a self-insured to
avoid providing primary liability coverage under the terms of its policy. See Jeffreys v. Snappy
Car Rental, Inc., 493 S.E.2d 767,769 (N.C. CL App. 1997) (ruling that automobile insurer may
expressly exclude liability coverage under owner's policy if lessee driver holds liability policy
for minimum amount of coverage required under state law); Champlain Cas. Co. v. Agency
Rent-A-Car, Inc., 716 A.2d 810, 816 (Vt. 1998) (concluding that, because car rental agency
required lessee to obtain or maintain other insurance, lessee's insurer under comprehensive
automobile liability policy had primary liability). For example, the owner of a rental vehicle
in these jurisdictions may avoid primary liability by requiring its lessees to have valid liability
insurance policies with other companies that cover rented vehicles and by expressly providing
in its lease agreements that the rental agency is not providing liability coverage. See Jeffreys,
493 S.E.2d at 769 (noting that insurer by terms of its policy may exclude liability coverage).
A statute may clearly require a self-insured to indemnify permissive users of its automobiles.
See Champlain Cas. Co., 716 A.2d at 812 (quoting state financial responsibility law, 23 V.SA.
§ 800(a), providing that certificate of self-insurance obtained by self-insured shall insure every
person operating motor vehicle with permission of self-insured). The Champlain Casualty court
treated self-insurance as other collectible insurance because Vermont's financial responsibility
law mandated that automobile owners who filed a certificate of self-insurance insure every
permissive operator of the insured vehicle. Id. at 814.
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imum payments are available.1 These courts have emphasized that liability
insurance requirements generally operate in favor of the state and of the
injured party and do not exist for the benefit of the negligent driver."9 In
other jurisdictions, when state financial responsibility laws require liability
insurance policies to include omnibus coverage, courts have determined that
the legislature also intended to require self-insureds who are certified under
the laws to provide the same coverage to permissive users of their vehicles."
D. Public Policy and Fairness Arguments
Courts that find self-insurance to be "other insurance" often make equita-
ble arguments for treating self-insurers like ordinary insurance companies for
the purpose of determining liability.20' These courts note that self-insurers
gain the dual benefit of not having to pay insurance premiums and of avoiding
primary liability when they can force another insurance company to pay.2
198. See American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 517 S.W.2d 110,
113-14 (Mo. 1974) (interpreting Missouri's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law to
confine self-insurance obligations to ensuring certain minimum payments to injured parties);
Home Indem. Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 314 S.W.2d 861, 865-66 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958)
(interpreting state motor vehicle financial responsibility law).
199. See Quick v. National Auto Credit, 65 F.3d 741, 745 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that
motor vehicle financial responsibility law obliges owners to protect public from judgment-proof
drivers by ensuring certain minimum payments); Home Indem., 314 S.W.2d at 866 ("The
guarantee by a self-insurer to pay any judgment that an insurance carrier would have to pay can
operate only for the benefit of the State... and the injured party and cannot... be construed
to operate for the benefit of the negligent driver.").
200. See Comorote v. Massey, 264 A2d 478, 480-81 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970)
(noting that state legislature has treated self-insured synonymously with one possessing auto-
mobile liability policy and, therefore, there was no sound basis for excluding self-insurer from
providing omnibus coverage); see also Hillegass v. Landwehr, 499 N.W.2d 652, 655 (Wis.
1993) (stating that legislative decision to permit companies to select manner in which they are
"insured" or financially responsible for liability to others does not mean that legislature intended
to permit self-insureds to avoid obligations and duties that arise from operating motor vehicles).
201. See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. Transport Indem. Co., 192 Cal. Rptr. 207, 210 (Ct. App.
1983) (noting that self-insured company had made risk management decision not to pay
premiums for liability coverage); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys.,
Inc., 359 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that to treat self-insured as anything
other than insurer for amount up to which it was self-insured would create windfall for self-
insured); Hillegass v. Landwehr, 499 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Wis. 1993) ("It seems inappropriate to
permit [the self-insured lessor] to escape liability merely because [the lessee] chose to purchase
an individual insurance policy when in fact [the self-insured lessor] would otherwise be
responsible." ).
202. See Hillegass, 499 N.W.2d at 655 ("[l]t would be fundamentally unfair ... to permit
companies... to self-insure and thereby escape both the expense of premium payments and the
possibility of being held liable as primary insurer."); Richmond, supra note 5, at 1455 (asserting
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Releasing an entity that chooses to self-insure from primary liability when
another insurance company insures the same risk confers a benefit upon the
self-insured at the expense of other insurers. 3 These other insurers normally
would look to each other under the "other insurance" provisions of their pol-
icies, and thus they have set their rates accordingly.2 When a self-insured
contractually undertakes the responsibility for a risk, treating a self-insured as
anything other than an insurer would create a windfall for the self-insured."'
The Wisconsin Supreme Court relied on these and other public policy argu-
ments in Hllegass v. Landwehr2 6 to hold that a self-insured company had
primary liability in an accident involving a car that it owned.2'
that pure risk retention and self-insured retentions are "other valid and collectible insurance"
within meaning of "other insurance" clause). According to Richmond,
[s]elf-insurance is the functional equivalent of a liability insurance policy. Rather
than paying premiums to an insurer to transfer risk, self-insureds retain risk in
exchange for lower premiums, or no premiums. In both instances, the transaction
is the same: there is an exchange of potential liability for premium payments. Self-
insurance is but one side of the same liability insurance coin.
Id.
203. See White v. Howard, 573 A.2d 513, 516 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (stating
that company that chooses to save insurance premiums by self-insuring its vehicles may not do
so partially at expense of other insurers).
204. Id.
205. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 359 N.W.2d at 676 (discussing car rental con-
tract whereby self-insured rental agency agreed to provide liability coverage for each vehicle
rented).
206. 499 N.W.2d 652 (Wis. 1993).
207. See Hillegass v. Landwehr, 499 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Wis. 1993) (holding that self-
insurer provided "insurance" within meaning of "other insurance" clause of automobile liability
policy). The Hillegass court decided whether self-insurance constituted other collectible insur-
ance within the meaning of an automobile liability insurance policy. Id. at 654. The collision
involved a Burlington Air Express-owned automobile that a Burlington employee was driving.
Id. at 653. Burlington was self-insured for the first one million dollars in damages. Id. The
employee held a liability insurance policy from an insurance company and was driving the car
on personal business at the time of the collision. Id. The employee's liability policy contained
an "other insurance" clause holding the issuing insurance company liable for "excess over any
other collectible insurance." Id. The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that a majority of the
twelve jurisdictions that had considered the issue had distinguished between insurance and self-
insurance on the basis of the contractual relationship existing between a third-party insurer and
its insured. Id. at 654. It also noted that four jurisdictions had adopted the "minority rule" that
defined self-insurance as "one subset of the familia [sic] insurance." Id. Rather than adopting
one of these rules, the court based its decision on the underlying public policies on which
Wisconsin insurance law is based, namely the fair and efficient allocation of resources and
related expressions of legislative purpose. Id. Central to the court's opinion was the fact that
Burlington made a discretionary, risk management decision to retain its own risk rather than pay
premiums to a third party insurer. Id. at 655. According to the court, "it would be fundamen-
tally unfair and contrary to the legislative intent to permit companies ... to self-insure and
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The Hillegass case involved an appeal from a circuit court decision
concluding that "self-insurance" could be "other insurance" within the mean-
ing of the "other insurance" clause of an automobile liability policy.208 The
lower court held that Burlington Air Express (BAE) was the primary insurer
of a BAE employee when the employee collided with another motorist while
driving a BAE company car.2" BAE was self-insured for the first one million
dollars of loss resulting from the operation of its motor vehicles and held a
two million dollar umbrella policy with an insurance company."' The em-
ployee held a liability insurance policy from an insurance company that
covered his negligence as a driver.2" The employee's liability policy con-
tained an "other insurance" provision stating that the policy "shall be excess
over any other collectible insurance."2"2 BAE argued that its self-insurance
was not "other collectible insurance" because the term insurance referred to
a contractual relationship between the insurer and the insured that was absent
in its self-insurance mechanism. 3
The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the rule it identified as predomi-
nant in other jurisdictions that distinguishes between insurance and self-insur-
ance on the basis of the contractual relationship existing between a third-party
insurer and its insured.214 The court identified four jurisdictions that applied
another line of reasoning and defined self-insurance as "one subset of the
familia [sic] insurance." '215 Rather than adopting the reasoning of the courts
in other states, however, the Hillegass court based its decision on the underly-
ing public policies providing the basis for Wisconsin insurance law, namely
the fair and efficient allocation of resources, and on related expressions of
thereby escape both the expense of premium payments and the possibility of being held liable
as primary insurer." Id. Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower court's determination that
the self-insured company that owned the vehicle responsible for the accident had primary
liability. Id. at 654.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 653.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 655.
214. See id. at 654 (concluding that courts that had distinguished between insurance and
self-insurance based on contractual relationship had not explained their rationale sufficiently).
215. See id. (identifying jurisdictions that treat self-insurance as "one subset of familia [sic]
insurance"). The court noted that the following states announced and followed the "minority
rule": California (citing U. S. Steel Corp. v. Transport Indem. Co., 50 Cal. Rptr. 576, 585 (Ct
App. 1966)); Minnesota (citing State Farm Mut Auto Ins. Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys. Inc.,
359 N.W.2d 673 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)); New Jersey (citing White v. Howard, 573 A.2d 513
(N.J. Super. Ct App. Div. 1990)); and South Carolina (citing Southern Home Ins. Co. v.
Burdette's Leasing Serv., Inc., 234 S.E.2d 870, 872 (S.C. 1977)). Id.
1279
56 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1245 (1999)
legislative purpose.216 Central to the court's opinion was the fact that BAE
made a discretionary, risk management decision to retain its own risk rather
than pay premiums to a third party insurer.217 The court concluded that it
would be fundamentally unfair and contrary to the legislative intent to permit
companies to self-insure and thereby escape both the expense of premium
payments and the possibility of being held liable as primary insurer.21
Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower court's determination that the self-
insured company that owned the vehicle responsible for the accident had
primary liability.
2 19
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Hillegass in a jurisdic-
tion in which the motor vehicle financial responsibility law required certified
self-insurers to agree to pay the same amounts that an insurer would have been
obligated to pay under a motor vehicle liability policy, this fact was not
determinative.22 BAE was not a certified self-insurer, and Wisconsin law did
not require companies to obtain proof of insurance or self-insurance.2 21 The
court considered the language of the motor vehicle financial responsibility law
to be an expression of legislative intent not to permit individuals who self-
insured to escape the liabilities that would attach to third-party insurers.222
Although the court considered the statutory language, no reason exists to
conclude that the Wisconsin court intended to confine its opinion on the
nature of self-insurance to the automobile liability context.2's The court
emphasized the general public policy reasons behind its decision and broadly
stated that "[t]he phrase 'other collectible insurance' necessarily embraces all
forms of insurance, including self-insurance."'224
216. See H-illegass v. Landwehr, 499 N.W.2d 652, 654 (Wis. 1993) (concluding that
decisions in other jurisdictions were not sufficiently well-reasoned to serve as precedent).
217. See id. at 655 (discussing that Wisconsin law allows entities to choose method of
covering risk and does not mandate insurance).
218. Id.
219. See id. at 654 (finding persuasive circuit court's assessment of public policies and
common law doctrines that led lower court to conclude that self-insurance constitutes insur-
ance).
220. See id. at 656 (discussing Wisconsin motor vehicle financial responsibility law).
221. See id. at 655 ("Wisconsin companies may self-retain a limited amount of risk, pur-
chase full third-party coverage or opt to remain entirely uninsured and expose themselves to
unlimited liability.").
222. See id. at 656 ("[Pjermitting individuals to self-retain risk was not intended by the
legislature to be a device by which self-insurers could escape the liabilities that would attach
to third-party insurers.").
223. See Richmond, supra note 5, at 1455 ("[T]here is no reason to believe that Hillegass
should be limited to automobile liability policies, or that it does not generally state Wisconsin
law.").
224. Hillegass v. Landwehr, 499 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Wis. 1993).
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Other courts have rejected the argument that it is unfair to permit self-
insured entities to escape liability under "other insurance" clauses.' One
court has suggested that an insurance company can protect itself from the self-
insurance as "other insurance" dilemma by including language in its policy
stating that its coverage is excess over any other valid and collectible insur-
ance or self-insurance. 6 Courts holding that self-insurance is not other insur-
ance have also noted that courts interpret insurance policies most strongly
against the insurer who prepared it.7
E. Special Self-Insurance Issues Affecting Governmental Entities
The determination of whether self-insurance is a form of insurance has
a potentially large impact on municipalities and other governmental entities
because many provide some form of self-insurance.' Governmental entities
that choose to self-insure face many of the same "other insurance" questions
that private entities do,' and they face additional issues related to sovereign
immunity.23 These entities have traditionally enjoyed the protection of soy-
225. See Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. National Cas. Co., 804 F. Supp. 768, 777
(E.D.N.C. 1992) (holding that hospital's self-insured retention did not constitute "other valid
and collectible insurance" within meaning of"other insurance" clause of nurse's policy).
226. See id. (explaining that insurance company could have created an excess provision
that applied to self-insurance).
227. See United Nat Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 289 A.2d 179, 182 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1972) ("[lit is well established that an insurance policy will be construed most strongly
against the insurer who has prepared it.. ").
228. See Berkely, supra note 6, at 693 (describing struggle of self-insured governmental
entities to maintain sovereign immunity); see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. James J. Benes &
Assocs., Inc., 593 N.E.2d 1087, 1089 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (determining whether contractual
agreement between municipality and intergovernmental risk management agency pool of self-
insured municipalities, required the agency to share responsibility to defend and indemnify
municipality with commercial liability insurer under principle of contribution); Blackwelder v.
Winston-Salem, 420 S.E.2d 432,434 (N.C. 1992) (determining whether city waived its govern-
mental immunity by organizing corporation to handle claims against city of $1,000,000 or less
when city controls corporation and city agrees to reimburse corporation for all payments); infra
note 230 (citing cases deciding whether municipality waived sovereign immunity by self-
insuring).
229. See Gary v. Allstate Ins. Co., 612 N.E.2d 115, 119 (Ind. 1993) (determining that
financial responsibility law does not require self-insured municipality to provide uninsured
motorist protection for those who drive their automobiles because law applies only to "insurers"
who issue policy of insurance); Ellis v. Rhode Island Pub. TransitAuth., 586 A.2d 1055, 1159
(R.I. 1991) (stating that transit authority, like any other self-insurer, was exempt from uninsured
motorist coverage requirement).
230. See generally Mims v. Clanton, 475 S.E.2d 662 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (determining that
county's risk management fund for investigation and defense of tort claims was self-insurance
plan constituting liability insurance that waived sovereign immunity); Laramie v. Facer, 814
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ereign immunity, and insurance companies cannot enforce "other insurance"
clauses against them if the entities are shielded from liability."3 However,
sovereign immunity does not apply to potential claims in a growing number
of categories and does not immunize government employees from liability for
their own tortious acts committed in connection with their employment.3 2 For
this reason, municipalities generally carry some form of insurance or self-
insurance to cover their liability in connection with non-immune actions and
to protect their employees.3 In those jurisdictions in which a governmental
entity waives its sovereign immunity by purchasing insurance, 34 setting up a
self-insurance scheme also may waive immunity3 5 Legislation in many states
regulates how governmental entitits may insure or self-insure risks and often
explicitly states that a governmental entity waives sovereign immunity by self-
insuring.2
6
P.2d 268 (Wyo. 1991) (holding that creation of governmental fund pooling association did not
constitute waiver of municipalities' sovereign immunity). See also McKinley et al, supra note
20, at 774-75 (discussing contexts in which courts have determined whether self-insurance
should be treated like insurance policy). The reverse is also true; determining whether self-
insurance is insurance in the sovereign immunity context may determine whether self-insurance
is "other insurance." See Jamesj. Benes, 593 N.E.2d at 1091-92 (relying on decision holding
that municipal risk pooling agreement did not constitute waiver of sovereign immunity to find
that intergovernmental risk management agency did not have responsibility to defend and
indemnify municipality, although insurer would have been so obligated).
231. See Blodgett, supra note 33, at 48 (stating that governmental bodies have been
immune from most negligence suits in recent past); Coffey, supra note 37, at 713 (describing
"slow erosion of governmental immunity").
232. See Blodgett, supra note 33, at 50 (describing expanding concepts of municipal
liability); Coffey, supra note 37, at 715 (noting that governmental immunity applies to govern-
mental entity alone and not to individuals serving in governmental capacity).
233. See Coffey, supra note 37, at 716-17 (listing reasons why local governments may
choose to purchase insurance and forego its inherent authority to refuse to pay claims under
sovereign immunity doctrine). Municipalities in some jurisdictions experience a dilemma
because the municipality waives its sovereign immunity from tort liability by purchasing
insurance. See McKinley et al., supra note 20, at 775 (stating that immunity waiver provision
results in litigation over whether self-insurance fund constitutes insurance and, as consequence,
constitutes waiver).
234. See supra note 18 (citing state statutes that provide for waiver of sovereign immunity
by purchasing insurance policy).
235. See Berkely, supra note 6, at 693 (describing usefulness of self-insurance to govern-
mental entities).
236. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 1329 (1993) (stating that doctrine of sovereign
immunity applies to any Delaware Transportation Authority service or activity unless insurance
policy or self-insurance covers service or activity); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-17 (Supp. 1998)
("If liability coverage, either through insurance policies or self-insurance retention is in effect,
immunity from suit shall be waived only to the limit of liability established by such insurance
or self-insurance program."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.1070 (West 1997) (stating that, in certain
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In some cases, governmental risk retention pools so strongly resemble
insurance providers that courts treat them as insurers." Making a clear dis-
tinction is difficult because self-insured municipalities take on many of the
traditional funotions of insurance companies, including claim adjustment?"
and litigation defense."9 Often several municipalities share these responsibili-
ties through risk pooling associations.24
situations of tort liability, entity waives sovereign immunity to maximum amount of existing
policy of insurance or self-insurance plan). Laws in other states provide that the purchase of
insurance or procurement of self-insurance does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity
under some or all circumstances. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.06 (West 1994) ("Procure-
ment of commercial insurance, participation in a self-insurance pool. . . , or provision for an
individual self-insurance plan... shall not constitute a waiver of any governmental immunities
or exclusions."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-221 (1997) (stating that nothing in article providing
for higher education insurance or self-insurance shall be deemed to waive state's sovereign
immunity); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-23.1-02 (1995) (stating that participation in governmental
self-insurance pool does not constitute waiver of immunities); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-132.1
(Michie 1988) (stating that purchase of insurance or creation of self-insurance plan by Port
Authority shall not be deemed waiver of sovereign immunity).
237. See Richmond, supra note 5, at 1444-45 (stating that it is currently impossible to state
general rule governing application of "other insurance" clauses to self-insurance). Compare
Laramie v. Facer, 814 P.2d 268, 270-71 (Wyo. 1991) (holding that creation of governmental
fund pooling association, created to defray costs arising from exceptions to municipalities'
sovereign immunity from tort liability, was not purchase of insurance and that participation in
association did not extend members' liability exposure) with Eakin v. Indiana Intergovernmental
Risk ManagementAuth., 557 N.E.2d 1095,1102 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (determining that Indiana
Intergovernmental Risk Management Authority was actually offering insurance through
members' contractual relationship, rather than, as townships contended, providing mechanism
whereby townships could self-insure).
238. See Richmond, supra note 5, at 1449 (describing self-insured corporation's responsi-
bilities under self-insured retention).
239. See WINDT, supra note 73, § 11.31, at 348 (describing difference between self-insured
retention and deductible).
For example, the Wyoming legislature has provided for a local government self-insurance
program managed by a self-insurance program board. See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-42-203
(Michie 1999). The board's duties include the following: (i) administering the program;
(ii) providing legal services for the defense of claims covered by the act; (iii) procuring insur-
ance, including reinsurance, purchase loss prevention, actuarial and other professional services
as required by the board; (iv) establishing assessments to provide for expenditures as to create
adequate reserves to operate the program on an actuarially sound basis; (v) apportioning and
collecting assessments from each participating local government; (vi) establishing deductibles
or retentions as deemed necessary, and (vii) adopting rules governing the administration of the
program. Id.
240. See Eakin, 557 N.E.2d at 1102 (describing Indiana Intergovernmental Risk Manage-
ment Authority as local government shared risk group); Laramie, 814 P.2d at 270-71 (describ-
ing Wyoming Association of Risk Management as governmental fund pooling association
created to defray costs arising from exceptions to municipalities' sovereign immunity from tort
liability).
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In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. James J Benes & Associates,24 the
Appellate Court of Illinois considered whether the Intergovernmental Risk
Management Agency (IRMA), a municipal joint risk management pool, had
the same obligation to contribute to the settlement of a claim as an insurer.242
The determination of whether IRMA constituted insurance was necessarily the
same under the principle of contribution as it would have been under an "other
insurance" clause, except that the other insurer's liability was based on equita-
ble principles instead of an "other insurance" contract provision.243 Relying
heavily on a decision which held that self-insured public entities did not waive
sovereign immunity,24 the James J Benes court distinguished the purchase
of insurance from licensed insurance companies from self-insurance. 245 The
court based its decision partly on a public policy interest of protecting public
funds.246 Although IRMA provided its members with various risk manage-
241. 593 N.E.2d 1087 (IlI.App. Ct. 1992).
242. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. James J. Benes & Assocs., 593 N.E.2d 1087, 1089 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992) (determining whether contractual agreement between municipality and Intergov-
ernmental Risk Management Agency pool of self-insured municipalities (IRMA), required
IRMA to share responsibility to defend and indemnify municipality with commercial liability
insurer under principle of contribution). In James J Benes, the municipality's insurer filed a
claim seeking partial reimbursement for the settlement of a claim against the municipality's
from IRMA. Id. at 1088. IRMA provided its members with various risk management services,
including defense and settlement of claims, and paid their claims out of pooled funds. Id. The
insurer based his claim on the equitable principle of contribution, which permits an insurer who
has paid an entire loss to receive reimbursement from other insurers who cover the same risk
on the same basis for the same parties. Id. The court concluded that IRMA was not to be treated
the same as private insurance carriers. Id. at 1092. The court determined that the sharing of risk
under IRMA was distinguishable from shifting the same risk to for-profit companies. Id. The
IRMA contract required supplemental contributions from all members, even those who sub-
mitted no claims, if liabilities exceeded annual contributions to the funds. Id. The court con-
cluded that the issuer of the municipality's commercial insurance policy was not entitled to
contribution from IRMA. Id.
243. Compare id. at 1090 ("In order for a settling insurer to recover in a contribution
action, the policies must cover a risk on the same basis, and there must be identity between the
policies as to parties and insurable interests and risks.") with Koepff, supra note 111, at 251
(stating that "other insurance" refers to existence of another insurer that insures same risk, for
benefit of same entity, during same period of time).
244. See JamesJ. Benes, 593 N.E.2d at 1091-92 (discussing generally Antiporek v. Village
of Hillside, 499 N.E.2d 1307 (II. 1986), case holding that membership in IRMA substantially
amounts to pooled self-insurance of governmental entities and does not operate as waiver of
municipal tort immunities).
245. See id. at 1092 (stating that public policy interest in protecting taxpayer revenues
provides basis for distinction between self-insured municipalities and municipalities that hold
private insurance policy).
246. See id. (noting that, when municipality self-insures, it bears all risk itself and pays
settlements or awards directly from government coffers).
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ment services and paid claims out of pooled funds, the court determined that
this sharing of risk was distinguishable from shifting the same risk to for-
profit companies.247 The court distinguished the IRMA contract from a com-
mercial policy because the IRMA contract required supplemental contribu-
tions from all members, even those who submitted no claims, if liabilities
exceeded annual contributions to the funds.248 In addition, all the costs were
completely internalized, and no private enterprises or non-governmental enti-
ties profited from IRMA.249 State law permits municipalities to self-insure,
and the court stated that it would be unfair to penalize municipalities that were
too small to carry their own risk for sharing their risk with other municipali-
ties." The court concluded that the issuer of the municipality's commercial
insurance policy was not entitled to contribution from IRMA. s The James
J. Benes decision suggests that governmental entities who self-insure may
receive more favorable treatment than private self-insurers." s2 Statutes in
other jurisdictions clearly state that governmental self-insurance mechanisms
are not insurance and that municipalities are not subject to the same treatment
as insurers.3
247. See id. at 1091 (explaining that risk is not shifted to insurance company under IRMA,
but rather is shared by self-insured entities).
248. See id. (describing system of self-insurance that municipalities used). Although the
James J Benes court distinguished IRMA from a traditional insurance policy based in part on
the fact that all participants in the risk pool were responsible for increasing their contributions
if the pool's payments exceeded income, this was a feature of early insurance policies. See
Scott A. Taylor, Taxing Captive Insurance: A New Solution for an Old Problem, 42 TAX
LAw. 859, 865-66 (1989) (describing invention of modem fire insurance in seventeenth century
with creation of Friendly Society that wrote fire insurance on mutual assessment basis and
other mutual associations that increased members' premiums based on group's claim experi-
ence).
249. See James J Benes, 593 N.E.2d at 1091 (stating that, because only governmental
entities participated in IRMA, there was no danger that private persons would receive uncon-
scionable profits by asserting immunities).
250. See id. (describing self-insurance pool as protecting small governmental entities from
potential fiscal disasters).
251. See id. at 1093 (determining whether contractual agreement between municipality and
IRMA required IRMA to defend and indemnify municipality).
252. See supra notes 244-51and accompanying text (describing court's consideration of
facts that municipality was attempting to preserve public funds and that private insurer did not
profit).
253. SeeN.D. CENTr. CODE § 26.1-23.1-02 (1995) (stating thatparticipation in governmen-
tal self-insurance pool does not constitute waiver of immunities); Orange County Water Dist.
v. Assoc. of Cal. Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Author., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 185 (Ct. App.
1997) (stating that California law expressly provides that joint powers agreement that created
Association of California Water Agencies Joint Powers Insurance Authority to self-insure risk
is not insurance).
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V A Suggested Approach to "Other Insurance" Clauses and
Self-Insured Entities
The term "self-insurance" encompasses a broad range of risk retention
plans and includes both modest deductibles 4 and complex insurance schemes
in which a company or a group creates a foreign insurance company to under-
write its risks." 5 Therefore, determining whether a particular form of self-
insurance is "other insurance" necessarily entails a fact-specific inquiry. 6
Courts should uniformly structure this inquiry to provide the highest degree
of predictability possible. First, courts should identify the relationship be-
tween the tortfeasor and the self-insured."5 7 Specifically, courts should treat
self-insurance the same as insurance for the purpose of an "other insurance"
clause if the self-insurer is acting as an insurer for another party." Courts
should treat the self-insured like an insurer if it has (1) agreed to indemnify
the torfeasor (2) for a specific loss (3) for consideration. 9 The self-insured
also should be liable under the "other insurance" clause if state law requires
that the self-insured party indemnify the tortfeasor, such as through a motor
vehicle rental statute.26 On the other hand, if the self-insured is itself the
tortfeasor, then the "other insurance" clause should not apply to the amount
of risk that is self-insured unless the state law requires the self-insured to
provide proof of financial responsibility.26 When state law requires proof of
ability to pay a particular type of judgment and permits an entity to satisfy the
254. See supra Part II.C.1 (describing deductibles as form of self-insurance).
255. See Tripoli, supra note 1250, at 10-11 (discussing captive insurance companies,
which other companies set up to underwrite risks, usually for well-defined group of insureds).
Insurance companies that are owned by their members are known as "captives." Id. at 10. A
single company or group often sets up captives offshore because other countries' laws are more
permissive than those of the United States regarding the formation of captives. Id. at 10-11.
For example, capital requirements are lower and captives are less heavily regulated in some
countries. Id. at 11.
256. See Richmond, supra note 5, at 1454-55 (stating that it is currently impossible to state
general rule governing application of "other insurance" clauses to self-insurance).
257. See supra notes 125-43 and accompanying text (describing approach used by Texas
courts).
258. See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text (describing approach used by court
in Champlain Cas. Co. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 716 A.2d 810 (Vt. 1998)).
259. See Champlain Cas. Co. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 716 A.2d 810, 814 (Vt. 1998)
(defining insurance) (citing BLACk'S LAW DICTIONARY 721 (5th ed. 1979)).
260. See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text (describing approach that court used
in Champlain Cas. Co., 716 A.2d at 810).
261. See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text (describing court's interpretation of
financial responsibility law in Southern Home Ins. Co. v. Burdette 's Leasing Service, Inc., 234
S.E.2d 870 (S.C. 1977)).
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requirement with self-insurance, the court should treat self-insurance as "other
insurance" up to the limit of the financial responsibility requirement unless
state law clearly states otherwise.262
A. Identifying the Relationship Between the Self-Insured
and the Tortfeasor
The approach suggested above would have lead to a different analysis in
Passaic General.263 Before concluding that a partially self-insured hospital
did not provide its employees with insurance, the Passaic General court
considered whether the contract between the hospital and its excess insurer
required the hospital to indemnify its employees.2" Under the suggested
approach, the court instead would have considered the relationship between
the nurse, as the tortfeasor, and the partially self-insured hospital.265 If the
hospital had agreed to indemnify its employees against liability for their own
negligence as part of the employment contract, the court should have treated
the agreement as insurance. In Passaic General, the court did not decide
whether the hospital had a binding agreement with the nurse to indemnify her
because the court concluded that such an agreement would not have changed
its analysis because the nurse who obtained the insurance policy would not
have considered it to be "other insurance.' 2e
Courts should treat an employer like the one in Passaic Generafl67 and
a rental agency like the one in Champlain Casualty 21 similarly for the pur-
poses of state financial responsibility laws. Under certain circumstances, an
indemnity agreement between self-insured employers and their employees
may constitute insurance.269  For example, if the law required health care
providers to have malpractice insurance or equivalent proof of their ability to
262. See supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding that self-
insurers under state laws must provide coverage as insurer would provide).
263. See supra notes 150-64 and accompanying text (discussing generallyAmerican Nurses
Ass'n v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 484 A.2d 670 (N.J. 1984)).
264. See supra notes 150-59 and accompanying text (discussing facts of Passaic General).
265. See supra notes 254-62 (suggesting approach to self-insurance as "other insurance"
issue); supra notes 150-64 and accompanying text (discussing Passaic General and converse
case authority).
266. See American Nurses Ass'n v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 484 A.2d 670, 674 (N.J. 1984)
(stating that private indemnity agreements are not included in "other insurance" provision).
267. See supra notes 150-59 and accompanying text (discussing facts of Passaic General).
268. See supra notes 174-180 and accompanying text (discussing facts of Champlain
Casualty).
269. See Chicago Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 967 S.W.2d 35,35 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997)
(stating that employee is "insured" under self-insured employer's fronting policy).
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pay judgments, and the self-insured hospital agreed to provide coverage for
its employees, an insurance relationship would exist.270
B. A Broader Definition ofInsurance Under State
Financial Responsibility Laws
A better approach than those that courts currently use to resolve the
question of whether self-insurance is "other insurance" for purposes of "other
insurance" clauses exists. In Champlain Casualty, the court defined insurance
as a "contract whereby, for a stipulated consideration, one party undertakes
to compensate the other for loss on a specified subject by specified perils."
271
The court considered whether the parties' contractual relationship, along with
the obligations that the state financial responsibility laws imposed, constituted
insurance under this definition.2  Although the Champlain Casualty court
narrowly interpreted the relevant statute,273 the Southern Home court broadly
interpreted ambiguous financial responsibility laws to require self-insurers to
pay the same claims that insurers subject to "other insurance" clauses would
have to pay.274 When state law allows an entity to satisfy financial responsi-
bility requirements by obtaining either a liability insurance policy or a state-
issued certificate of self-insurance, courts should interpret the statute to
require that self-insurers be responsible whenever an insurer would be, absent
clear legislative intent to the contrary.275 Combining the Champlain Casualty
approach276 with the Southern Home court's broad interpretation of state
financial responsibility laws277 provides a method of analysis superior to that
of courts that rely on a narrow definition of insurance. This approach adopts
270. See supra Part V (suggesting approach to self-insurance as "other insurance" issue).
271. Champlain Cas. Co. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 716 A.2d 810, 814 (Vt. 1998).
272. See id. (concluding that rental car contract, along with state's financial responsibility
law, created relationship of insurance).
273. See id. at 812-14 (discussing treatment of "other insurance" in other jurisdictions
under state financial responsibility laws ). In Champlain Casualy, the state financial responsi-
bility law expressly required self-insured automobile owners to provide insurance for permissive
users of their vehicles. Id. at 814. The Champlain Casualty court suggested that, in the absence
of the clear expression of legislative intent, it would not have found that the self-insurer was not
obligated to indemnify the tortfeasor and, therefore, did not provide "other insurance." See id.
at 813 (citing with approval Home Indem. Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 314 S.W.2d 861 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1958)).
274. See Southern Home Ins. Co. v. Burdette's Leasing Serv., Inc., 234 S.E.2d 870, 873
(S.C. 1977) (interpreting financial responsibility statute); supra notes 189-92 and accompanying
text (discussing Southern Home Ins. Co.).
275. See Southern Home, 234 S.E.2d at 873 (interpreting financial responsibility statute).
276. See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text (discussing Champlain Casualty).
277. See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text (discussing Southern Home).
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-the Hillegass court's policy argument that, although the legislature permits
companies to formulate the most efficient insurance coverage, including self-
insurance, the legislature did not intend to create a device to avoid liability by
the self-retention of risk." It permits insurers to look to self-insurers under
the "other insurance" provisions of their policies when they have a reason to
expect "other insurance" to be available because of state financial responsibil-
ity laws.2" When the law does not require an entity to have insurance, this
approach would leave the responsibility to the insurance company to include
provisions in its policy stating that the policy was excess to self-insurance.8
VI. Conclusion
Determining whether self-insurance is "other insurance" by attempting
to fit the abstract concept of self-insurance into a narrow definition of insur-
ance and applying this conclusion to every form of self-insurance is an unsat-
isfactory approach for two reasons. First, different courts may not reach the
same conclusions, depending on how broadly they define insurance.281
Although a court could adopt a "lay person" standard like that in Passaic
General,' this approach may not be appropriate when highly sophisticated
self-insureds intentionally combine self-insurance with some features of tradi-
tional insurance policies" or when state financial responsibility statutes
are in effect. 4 Second, state-issued certificates of self-insurance are often
278. Hillegass v. Landwehr, 499 N.W.2d 652,656 (Wis. 1993).
279. See supra notes 254-262 (proposing approach to self-insurance as "other insurance"
conflicts).
280. Id.
281. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (comparing different courts' application
of definition of insurance to self-insurance).
282. See supra notes 155,156 and accompanying text (describing Passaic General court's
use of lay person standard to conclude that self-insurance was not "other insurance").
283. See Michael G. Patrizio, Fables of Construction: The Sophisticated Policyholder
Defense, 79 ILL. B.J. 234 (1991) (discussing how large commercial businesses differ from
individuals in degree of sophistication in approach to purchasing insurance policy and how this
difference should affect widely applied doctrine of construing ambiguous contract provisions
against insurer). Patrizio notes that large corporations often hire independent brokers to create
a large insurance program to cover many types of risks. Id. Often, corporations have their own
insurance department and evaluate and handle their own claims. Id. Large corporations also
may eschew primary coverage for a self-insurance program or use a fronting policy in order to
save on premiums. Id. In reference to the doctrine of strictly construing ambiguous contract
provisions against the insurer, Patrizio argues that "common sense mandates a different approach
to the ordinary rules governing construction of an insurance policy when a large policyholder
is involved." Id.
284. See Champlain Cas. Co. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 716 A2d 810, 813 (Vt. 1998)
(stating that deciding whether self-insurance is "other collectible insurance" based on simple
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available only to large companies with considerable assets."8 If self-insurers
are not liable under the same circumstances that an insurance company would
be, insurance companies will bear the sole responsibility of paying more
claims, and these costs will be passed along to entities that are unable to self-
Insure.
286
definition of insurance is unhelpful when self-insurer has some obligation to pay for conse-
quences of another's negligence under financial responsibility law).
285. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (providing examples ofjunsdictions that
require certified self-insurers to have twenty-five or more motor vehicles registered in their
names).
286. See Hillegass v. Landwehr, 499 N.W.2d 652, 655-56 (Wis. 1993) (discussing public
policy considerations regarding self-insureds' responsibility for claims).
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